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The Clean Water Act and Evolving Due Process: The
Emergence of Contemporary Enforcement Procedures
I. Introduction
Environmental laws did not concern early American lawmakers. Congress
gave attention to other matters as it worked to provide governing principles
on which to build a nation. As the twentieth century approached, however,
the growing population of America began to wear on the environment. By
1900, nearly 40% of Americans lived in urban areas.1 Denser populations
created new problems, resulting in heavily polluted streams and rivers.2
Early in the twentieth century, the primary concern respecting water
quality derived from fear about disease transmittance.3 People regarded rivers
as a dumping ground for sewage, leading to ideal conditions for certain
contagious waterborne diseases.4 Despite health concerns, pollution in
waterways continued to increase as industry grew.5 Treatment for waste was
expensive, and the social attitude embraced water pollution merely as “an
inevitable penalty of progress.”6 At one point, a sanitary engineering report
observed “that a waterway passing through [Chicago] was so fetid from
waste discharges that small animals had no difficulty in running back and
forth across its scum-crusted surface.”7 Such reports were not uncommon, as
similar conditions existed throughout waterways in America. In Cleveland

1. UNITED STATES CENSUS, STATISTICS OF POPULATION, at lxxxiv (1900) (defining an
urban area as a town or city with 4000 or more people).
2. See Jouni Paavola, Water Quality as Property: Industrial Water Pollution and
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century United States, 8 ENV’T & HIST. 295, 301 (2002).
Urbanization created issues with sewage disposal and increased industrialization. Id.
Although by 1911 the most heavily populated cities had put sewer systems in place, these
systems did not necessarily treat the water. William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water
Pollution Control in the Unites States–State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I,
22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 166 (2003). Rather than prevent the further spread of pollution,
these systems often added to the problem by discharging large amounts of untreated sewage
and wastewater into nearby waters. Id.
3. Edward J. Cleary, Evolution of Social Attitudes and Action on Water Pollution
Control, 44 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N 1301, 1301 (1972).
4. Id. at 1301-02.
5. Id. at 1302 (“Entire waterways were being rendered unfit for any use except as
sewers.”).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1301.
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during 1936, a large river known as the Cuyahoga caught fire and burned for
five days, feeding off the oil, sewage, and other debris infiltrating the water.8
Fortunately, social attitudes have changed. A waterway so polluted that its
status as a waterway becomes debatable is no longer considered acceptable.
By the 1940s, people began to take notice of the deterioration of American
waters,9 and, in 1948, the first Clean Water Act (CWA) emerged under the
name of the Water Pollution Control Act.10 The 1948 Act lent focus to the
idea of clean water, but conceded little power to the federal government.11
Congress did not become serious about the state of the nation’s waters until
1972.12 The congressional goal of the 1972 amendments was to provide
waters to the public that were both “fishable and swimmable.”13 Despite this
goal, a 2004 report to Congress found that 44% of assessed river and stream
miles and 64% of assessed lakes contained waters unfit for either fishing or
swimming.14
The modern version of the CWA gives the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) much more power than was included in the original 1948 Act.
Many people do not like that the EPA has this power, and there still exists a
social attitude that “progress” and industry cannot coexist with a clean
environment—that these environmental goals impede industry “progress.”15
8. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 99-101 (2002). Additionally, a river
in Baltimore, the Buffalo River in New York, and the Rouge River in Michigan all caught
fire. Id. at 105. The Cuyahoga River caught fire repeatedly, with reports of fires in 1868,
1883, 1887, 1912, 1922, 1930, 1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, and 1969. Id. at 101-04.
9. Cleary, supra note 3, at 1302-03.
10. See Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)).
11. See id.
12. See 133 CONG. REC. S1691-01 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
13. Id. (“[T]he fundamental goal of the Clean Water Act [was] that the Nation’s waters
be ‘fishable and swimmable.’”).
14. EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 13, 16 (Jan.
2009), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/2009_01_22_
305b_2004report_2004_305Breport.pdf. Additionally, the report found that 30% of the
tested estuaries were impaired. Id. at 20. Although less than half of the nation’s waters were
tested, they provide a fairly reliable test group. Id. at 1-2.
15. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of
Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 462 (1994) (“Industry has challenged virtually every
regulation the EPA has issued under the [Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource and
Conservation Recovery Act].”); Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration:
Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n.117 (1988) (“In many
industries, environmental controls are a net cost item—that is why environmental laws must
exist.”); Heidi Przybyla, EPA Tops List of Business Complaints to Congress, BLOOMBERG
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It is necessary, however, that the federal government step in to control the
water pollution problem. Early versions of the CWA did not give the federal
government enough enforcement power; the government faced too many
procedural difficulties, and the statute provided polluters with no real
consequences for their actions.
Current enforcement procedures entrust power to both the EPA and
individuals to impose the CWA. The EPA can enforce the act by: (1) issuing
an administrative compliance order; (2) initiating a civil judicial enforcement
action; or (3) assessing an administrative penalty.16 Of the available
enforcement tools, the EPA most frequently uses administrative orders.17
Individuals may also seek to enforce the Act by initiating a citizen suit.18
(Feb. 7, 2011, 6:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-07/epa-rules-top-listof-business-complaints-to-issa-committee.html (“American businesses have a common
enemy: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.”). Many of these people come from
industries that do not want to worry about complying with regulations or incurring the high
fines that accompany large violations. See Houck, supra, at 462. Still others believe federal
funds should be spent on other regulations or do not believe in much federal regulation at all.
See JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’ OPPOSITION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 2-3 (2012).
16. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), (b), (g) (2012).
17. Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens Part Two: Statutory Preclusions
on EPA Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). Administrative orders
comprise approximately 90% of all enforcement actions taken by the EPA. See id.; see also
Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens Part One: Statutory Bars in
Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rev. 401, 415 n.68 (2004) [hereinafter Miller,
Part One].
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). Citizen suits can be brought by anyone against a discharger for
a failure to comply with the CWA. Id. § 1365(a). This includes an action “against any person
(including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution),” or against the
Administrator for failure to act. Id. § 1365(a)(1)-(2). The statute defines a “citizen” as “a
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” Id. § 1365(g).
To have an interest that is adversely affected, the plaintiff will generally have to show (1)
that there is an injury in fact which is “concrete and particularized” and “not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical,’” (2) that the defendant caused the injury, and (3) that a favorable decision
will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). If the plaintiff is a group, at least one
member of the group bringing suit must suffer the injury in fact. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Plaintiffs allege a proper injury
when “they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational
values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). When a citizen sues, the purpose is to gain an
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Citizen suits are intended as a back-up plan in the event that the EPA does
not enforce or take action against a violator.19
A primary concern of the CWA arises from the power it confers to federal
agencies, especially the EPA. The Supreme Court partially addressed the due
process implications of administrative compliance orders under the CWA in
the recent case of Sackett v. EPA.20 Sackett involved landowners seeking to
build a house on their property.21 In anticipation, the Sacketts deposited “fill
material” onto their land.22 Unfortunately for the Sacketts, however, the land
was considered a wetland by the EPA.23 After discovering the Sacketts filled

injunction to prevent further pollution and impose any other consequences to the polluter
required under the CWA. The citizen suit provision does not create monetary incentives for
citizens to bring action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Its purpose “is to allow citizens to act as
private attorneys general and enforce the CWA’s provisions where government officials
have [not].” 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Wrongful Discharge of Pollutant Into
Waterway under Federal Clean Water Act § 27 (1996). However, citizens may be able to
recover litigation costs. Id. § 34. Such a determination is made by the court in which the
action is brought. Id. For more information on citizen suits generally, see Miller, Part One,
supra note 17.
19. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (providing that if the EPA or a State is already
pursuing a civil or criminal action against the violator, then an individual cannot bring a
citizen suit, although the individual may be able to intervene); see also id. § 1365(b)(1)(A)
(providing that after a citizen gives notice of the alleged violation, he must wait sixty days
before actually commencing suit in order to allow either the Administrator or the State an
opportunity to take action, and also to see if the alleged violator takes action on his own).
20. See 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371-74 (2012). The case has caused controversy over the
extent of the EPA’s regulatory power. As a result, many organizations filed amicus briefs on
behalf of petitioners. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders et al. in
Support of the Petitioners, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL
4542131; Brief of the Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4564006; Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Am. Civil Rights Union in Support of Petitioners, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct.
1367 (2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4590836; Brief of Amici Curiae Wet Weather P’ship
et al. in Support of Petitioners, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct 1367 (2011) (No. 10-1062), 2011
WL 4642656.
21. Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367
(2012).
22. Id. “Fill Material” is any “material placed in waters of the United States where the
material has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry
land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.”
40 C.F.R § 232.2 (2012). In Sackett, the fill material consisted of dirt and rocks. Sackett, 622
F.3d at 1141.
23. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141.
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the wetland without first obtaining a permit,24 the EPA issued a “compliance
order requir[ing] the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the [land]
to its original condition.”25 The Sacketts responded to the order by
contending that the land was not a wetland subject to EPA jurisdiction.26 The
Ninth Circuit held: (1) the compliance order was not subject to judicial
review prior to the agency bringing action and (2) such preclusion was not
violative of due process.27 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari on two
issues: (1) whether the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)28 provides
petitioners the right to seek judicial review of an administrative compliance
order prior to the agency bringing an enforcement action and (2) if the APA
does not provide this right, whether preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial
review violates due process.29 Although the Sacketts originally brought a
claim disputing the status of their lands as wetlands subject to CWA
jurisdiction, this paper does not consider the issue of whether the property in
fact contained wetlands30 or whether the APA provides petitioners as a matter
24. Permits for filling in wetlands, including any type of discharge into a wetland, are to
be obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See infra note 30 and accompanying
text.
25. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141. The compliance order stated that if the Sacketts did not
remove the fill material, then they would be subject to fines. Id. “‘[F]ailure to comply [could
result in either] (1) civil penalties of up to $32,500 per day of violation . . . [or] (2)
administrative penalties of up to $11,000 per day for each violation.’” Id. (third and fourth
alterations in original).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 1147.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
29. Sackett v. EPA, 131 S. Ct. 3092, 3092 (2011).
30. Although wetlands regulation is governed by both the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps) and the EPA, it is the Corps who are responsible for issuing permits to
those wishing to discharge dredged or fill material into an area where wetlands are present.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344; 33 C.F.R § 320.4 (2012). Debate among the Corps and the courts
often involves discussion over what can reasonably be interpreted to constitute a “wetland.”
The Supreme Court is currently unsettled as to a definitive “wetlands” definition. In 1985,
the Court upheld an action by the Corps seeking to enjoin the owner of Riverside Bayview
Homes from filling wetlands in preparation for construction of a housing development.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). At that time, the
Corps defined wetlands as lands “‘inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.’”
Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1985)). The Court found the Corps’ interpretation of the
statute reasonable, taking into account the Corps’ explanation that wetlands may play a vital
role in the water quality of rivers, streams, lakes, and other traditionally “navigable”
waterways. Id. at 135. The Court upheld the Corps’ assertion that permits were required not
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of right the ability to sue under § 704. This comment focuses on the extent of
the EPA’s power with regard to issuing penalties and the effects such
penalties have on an individual’s due process rights.
To study the extent of the EPA’s enforcement power under the CWA and
the implications of this power, it is important to understand the Act’s history.
This paper explores the evolutionary processes of the CWA’s enforcement
procedures by examining the growth of the Act since its inception and the
effects of such growth. Part II gives a brief overview of the development of
administrative procedural due process to provide a constitutional background
against which the evolution of the CWA has taken place. Part III studies the
history of CWA enforcement procedures by analyzing the transformation of
the statute over time. Finally, Part IV discusses how the increase in available
enforcement procedures have been affected by changes in the ways the
Supreme Court and the American public view the requirements of due
process of law. The increase in available enforcement procedures, in part,
only prior to filling traditionally navigable waters, but also when filling wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters. Id. at 129. Although in 1985 the Court held that the Corps acted
reasonably in interpreting its jurisdiction to extend to wetlands adjacent to “waters of the
United States,” id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court later deviated. In
2001 the Court decided the wetland must be adjacent to an open body of water, not simply
any body of water. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 167-68 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC]. The dissent in SWANCC pointed out
that “once Congress crossed the legal watershed that separates navigable streams of
commerce from marshes and inland lakes, there is no principled reason for limiting the
statute’s protection to those waters or wetlands that happen to lie near a navigable stream.”
Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Rapanos v. United States, decided only a few years
later, the Court again upheld the narrowed interpretation of the Corps’ jurisdiction from
SWANCC. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2012). Justice Scalia, writing for a
plurality of the Court, found that the phrase “waters of the United States” meant waters
which were relatively permanent. Id. at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
the Court held that “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that
are ‘waters of the United States’” are wetlands within the Corps’ jurisdiction. Id. at 742
(emphasis omitted). The Rapanos decision, however, was not decided by a majority of the
Justices, making it difficult to determine how the Court will rule in the future. See id. at 718.
As it currently stands, there is assurance that wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water
are likely subject to regulation, but less assurance exists for those residing near a body of
water deemed non-navigable. For further discussion of what constitutes a wetland, see
Gregory T. Broderick, From Migratory Birds to Migratory Molecules: The Continuing
Battle over the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 473 (2005); James Murphy, Muddying the Waters of the Clean Water Act:
Rapanos v. United States and the Future of America’s Water Resources, 31 VT. L. REV. 355
(2007); Taylor Romigh, Comment, The Bright Line of Rapanos: Analyzing the Plurality’s
Two-Part Test, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3295 (2007).
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correlates to changing attitudes toward due process requirements and the
importance of clean water. Understanding the development of the CWA and
the history of accompanying social attitudes provides insight into the statute’s
current authority and how it may evolve in the future.
II. Summary of Administrative Procedural Due Process History
As Americans, the right to due process is fundamental to our way of
thinking. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”31 While the Constitution dates back approximately two
hundred years, the idea of due process can be traced as far back as the
fourteenth century.32 The 1354 version of the Magna Carta provided that
“‘[n]o free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed,
nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers and by the law of the land.’”33 This declaration was intended to
protect the innocent by providing procedural safeguards to ensure that laws
were not improvised to try particular cases.34 From these origins, the
American courts developed their own views on required procedures and the
meaning of due process.
In the administrative law context, due process procedures are required
before depriving an individual of liberty or property.35 Rapid regulatory
expansion occurred after the Great Depression, an event that increased
concern about individual due process rights.36 The continued increase in the
regulatory powers of governmental agencies signals the importance of
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Magna Carta ch. 39).
Id.
ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 192 (West Publ’g Co., 4th ed. 1997) (1972). Pursuant to the Constitution, due
process is required any time a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property. U.S. CONST.
amend V. In administrative decisions, however, deprivation of life is rarely an issue.
Therefore, most administrative due process issues deal with the procedures required for
deprivation of liberty or property.
36. Jill Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Public Policy Perspective,
MICH. B.J., Nov. 2006, at 38, 40. Due to the rapid expansion of regulatory agencies, many
people voiced concern that the expanding federal government would intrude upon their
rights. See id. In response, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 “as
an oversight tool designed to help increase accountability [of agencies] and to bring order to
a rapidly expanding government” by standardizing procedures, such as agency adjudication.
Id.
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understanding the procedures required prior to deprivation.37 Traditionally,
the benefits provided by agencies (such as welfare and occupational licenses)
were considered “privileges,” as opposed to rights, and thus were not subject
to a due process claim prior to deprivation.38 Eventually this distinction
between government privileges and fundamental rights disappeared.39
The Supreme Court decided a case in 1970 that appeared to radically
change the development of administrative law.40 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the
Court found that procedural due process required a hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits.41 The Court noted that a fundamental aspect
of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which must take place “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”42 The Court noted that
welfare recipients depend on welfare checks for their very subsistence and
thus should not be deprived of their checks prior to a hearing.43 Such hearings
should consist of a “timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting
any adverse witnesses and by presenting . . . arguments and evidence
orally.”44 This determination was problematic because, from its holding, it
37. See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE:
PROBLEMS AND CASES 240-41 (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed. 2010).
38. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 35, at 192-93 (“Traditionally . . . . [m]any
government benefits and grants were considered mere gratuities or ‘privileges’ rather than
rights; like a private donor, the government could impose whatever conditions it wished on
its gift, or even remove the benefit at will.”). The courts applied this view to benefits such as
employment or allowance of a license. Id. This rights-privileges distinction may have grown
out of the fact that early administrative due process issues were considered in light of
substantive due process claims, rather than as an independent issue. Paul R. Verkuil, The
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 281 (1978).
39. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 35, at 194. In place of the rights-privileges
distinction, the Supreme Court created a new test for when procedural due process was
implicated. Id. at 195. It held “that the requirements of procedural due process extend only to
those who have been deprived of ‘liberty’ or ‘property.’” Id. To have a property interest,
there must exist “a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ . . . rather than merely a ‘unilateral
expectation.’” Id.
40. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
41. Id. at 270-71.
42. Id. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 264-65.
44. Id. at 267-68. Goldberg might be seen “as a reaction against the inferior treatment
non-regulatory decisions had long received.” Verkuil, supra note 38, at 285. Because the
case dealt with welfare benefits, the Court traditionally saw this as part of the rightsprivileges distinction, placing it outside the concern of due process issues because it was a
benefit (a privilege) and not a right. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 35, at 193. The lack of
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appeared that Goldberg required a hearing prior to terminating any rights
whatsoever.45 Full trial-type hearings are expensive and time-consuming. As
a result of the significantly increased administrative process requirements
implicated by the Goldberg decision, the Court in 1976 reinterpreted how
courts and agencies determine the procedural processes required when
depriving an individual of liberty or property.46
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that Goldberg should be limited
only to its facts, as welfare recipients are different in kind from others
receiving government benefits.47 The Court created a three-part balancing
standard to determine the appropriate procedure for depriving a person of
liberty or property.48 First, the agency must determine the interest of the
individual and how that interest will be affected by the agency action (if the
individual’s interest is greatly at stake, then an agency’s procedural
requirements will likely be greater).49 Second, the agency must consider the
risk of unnecessary deprivation and whether additional procedural safeguards
would be effective in alleviating that risk.50 Third, the agency should consider
the government interest in using certain procedures.51 Government interests
include economic efficiency and resulting administrative burdens imposed by
additional procedural requirements.52 The government interest of using
particular procedures should be balanced against individual interests.53 The
Court held that a balancing test was necessary because due process should be
flexible, thus recognizing that different situations call for different procedural
protections, depending on the circumstances.54 “The essence of due process
is . . . that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case

procedural requirements and general ease of agencies to retract privileges, “created the
environment for a strong procedural due process reaction in Goldberg.” Id.
45. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-70.
46. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 335.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 334.
54. Id. (“‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972))).
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against him and the opportunity to meet it.’”55 As long as these conditions are
met, the requirements of due process are satisfied.
The Mathews test is still the standard used in determining the correct
administrative due process procedures. Its flexible balancing approach is
adaptive, making it an appropriate test to keep up with our changing world. A
concern associated with this balancing, however, is that it tends to tip the
scales in favor of the government more often than not.56 Although
disconcerting, no approach is perfect, and a balancing test is the most
practical way of weighing options to tailor procedures to the specific
circumstances at hand.
In the context of the CWA, the courts must find a balance between
ensuring protection for individual procedural due process rights and the
government interest of ensuring clean water for its people. Although “the
right to clean water” is not a phrase found in the United States Constitution, it
is a resource to which Congress has provided protection. This idea of water
protection has grown in response to the Court’s evolving interpretation of due
process requirements and in response to support from the American people.57
When an individual’s interest in building on a piece of property is assessed
against the availability of clean water for the nation, careful weighing of
values must be considered.
III. History of CWA Enforcement Procedures
A. CWA Beginnings
Congress first introduced the CWA in 1948 as the Water Pollution
Control Act (1948 WPCA).58 Originally, it had very little muscle. Similar to
the Articles of Confederation,59 the 1948 WPCA gave little power to the
55. Id. at 348-49 (second alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
56. The flexibility of the Mathews test often allows agencies significant amounts of
deference, raising the possibility that government efficiency claims may lead to harassment
of particular groups. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 35, at 234 (“Unless the utilitarian
calculus is applied with appropriate sensitivity to the worth and dignity of the individual,
government’s efficiency claims can become a cloak for petty oppression and harassment.”).
This result, however, is a possibility with many of the Court’s decisions.
57. See 118 CONG. REC. 37,452 (1972) (statement of Rep. John A. Blatnik).
58. See Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155, 1155
(1948) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)).
59. The Articles of Confederation was the first constitution of the United States. Donald
S. Lutz, The Articles of Confederation as the Background to the Federal Republic, 20
PUBLIUS 55, 55 (1990). Too much power in a centralized government concerned the early
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federal government60 and too much to the states. Also, much like the
Articles of Confederation, this off-balance arrangement led to serious
problems with an inability of the federal government to enforce the 1948
WPCA.
Congress enacted the 1948 WPCA in large part to combat the increasing
problem of sewage build-up in waterways.61 Although previous laws had
been enacted to confront water pollution problems, these previous statutes
focused specifically on pollution that impeded navigation and not
necessarily human health.62 Under the 1948 WPCA, the Surgeon General
acted as sole enforcer of its provisions.63 Because the 1948 statute had the
main purpose of determining whether a waterway was so badly polluted as
to become a nuisance, the Surgeon General could only bring suit if the
pollution affected interstate waters to the point it endangered the health or
welfare of people in another state.64 If a river was badly polluted but did not
carry the pollution into another state in such a concentration as to endanger
the health or welfare of people there, the statute provided no remedy.65
Additionally, the 1948 WPCA did not provide a remedy for people within
the state where the discharge originated.66 It reserved the decision of how to
framers. Lisa A. Ennis, Articles of Confederation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TARIFFS AND
TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY 26 (Cynthia Clark Northrup & Elaine C. Prange Turney eds., 2003).
As a result, the Articles of Confederation allotted much power to the states and hardly any to
a central government. Id. Without a centralized leader and continued bickering between the
states, the Articles quickly fell into dissolution, and the drafting of a new constitution began
in 1787. Id.
60. See Water Pollution Control Act § 2, 62 Stat. at 1155.
61. See id. § 2(a), 62 Stat. at 1155-56 (“[T]he Surgeon General is authorized to make
joint investigations with any such agencies of the condition of any waters in any State or
States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial wastes, or substance which may
deleteriously affect such waters.”).
62. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1924, ch. 316, § 3, 43 Stat. 604 (amended by Act of
Apr. 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 108, 84 Stat. 91); River and Harbor Appropriations Act
of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152.
63. Water Pollution Control Act § 1, 62 Stat. at 1155.
64. Id. § 2(d)(1), 62 Stat. at 1156. The text of the statute provides:
The pollution of interstate waters in or adjacent to any State or States (whether
the matter causing or contributing to such pollution is discharged directly into
such waters or reaches such waters after discharge into a tributary of such
waters), which endangers the health or welfare of persons in a State other than
that in which the discharge originates, is hereby declared to be a public
nuisance and subject to abatement as herein provided.
Id.
65. See Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155
66. See id.
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handle intrastate pollution problems to the state.67 By giving the states
discretion, the 1948 WPCA did not require the states to provide safe water
to their peoples.68
Even if the Surgeon General found an actionable violation, a series of
obstacles needed to be overcome before anything could be done. Upon
learning of a possible violation, the Surgeon General had to first provide
“formal notification to the alleged polluters, recommend measures for
abatement and set a reasonable time for the polluter to comply.”69 Then, the
Surgeon General was to send notice to the state in which the discharge
occurred.70 If the polluter refused to cease polluting, the Surgeon General
could send a reminder, once again notifying the state and the polluter of the
continued discharge.71 Only after this second notification could the Surgeon
General recommend to the state that a suit be initiated to secure abatement
of the pollution.72 However, a mere recommendation did not satisfy the
process required to bring legal action. Initiation of a suit required several
additional steps.
If after the second notice no action occurred, the Federal Security
Administrator73 could assemble a committee to find a reasonable solution.74
67. See id.
68. This is evidenced by the fact that several river fires occurred even after enactment of
the 1948 WPCA. For example, Cleveland, Ohio, chose to do little to protect its own citizens,
illustrated by the Cuyahoga River fires of 1952 and 1969. Adler, supra note 8, at 103-04.
The 1952 fire resulted from unregulated oil discharges. Id. at 103. A lack of enforcement
against polluters allowed the oil to accumulate so that it formed a two-inch blanket across
the river’s surface. Id. In some places it provided a cover from bank to bank. Id.
69. Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1970).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Water Pollution Control Act § 2(d)(2)).
73. The Federal Security Administrator headed the Federal Security Agency (FSA).
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939 § 201(a), 53 Stat. 1423, 1424. The FSA was a
consolidation of the United States Employment Service Department from the Department of
Labor, the Office of Education (previously part of the Department of the Interior), the Public
Health Service (including the Surgeon General), and the National Youth Administration into
one department. Id. (“[T]hese agencies and their functions, together with the Social Security
Board and its functions, and the Civilian Conservation Corps and its functions, are hereby
consolidated under one agency to be known as the Federal Security Agency, with a Federal
Security Administrator at the head thereof.”).
74. Water Pollution Control Act § 2(d)(3), 62 Stat. at 1156-57 (allowing the
Administrator “to call a public hearing . . . before a board of five or more persons appointed
by the Administrator”).
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This reasonable solution was to be based on evidence presented at a
hearing.75 If the polluter did not comply with the solution created by the
board, then the Administrator might be able to take action.76 The ability to
take action depended on whether the Administrator could obtain consent
from the appropriate state agency or official.77 Once the Administrator
obtained consent, he could make an official request for the United States
Attorney General to bring suit against the polluter.78 Even then, this was
only a suggestion. The statute provided no requirement that action be
brought.79
If the Attorney General chose to bring suit, the statute mandated that the
court give “due consideration to the practicability and to the physical and
economic feasibility of securing abatement of any pollution proved.”80 This
meant that regardless of the danger to human health posed by the pollution,
if the court found abatement to create a hardship to the polluter, abatement
would not be required.81 Such a standard made it highly unlikely the
government would prevail in court; yet it remained the judicial standard
until 1972.82 The cumbersome procedure made the 1948 WPCA highly
ineffective for controlling water pollution.83 The combination of the
required procedures and the judicial standard eviscerated any power the
statute might have had. As might have been expected, the 1948 Act inspired
not one lawsuit under its authority.84
B. Amendments to the Original WPCA (1956-1966)
The lack of progress resulting from the 1948 WPCA did not go
unnoticed. In 1955 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
75. Id. § 2(d)(3), 62 Stat. at 1157.
76. Id. § 2(d)(4), 62 Stat. at 1157.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 2(d)(7), 62 Stat. at 1157.
81. Barry, supra note 69, at 1107.
82. See id. at 1120 (noting the standard had not changed with the latest amendment in
1970). The 1972 amendments to the 1948 WPCA introduced a permitting system as a means
of ensuring compliance with water quality standards. See Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402, 86 Stat. 816, 880-83 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (2012)). To hold a polluter responsible after the 1972 amendments, the only
standard that need be shown is that a violation of the permit conditions occurred. Id. § 309,
86 Stat. at 859.
83. Barry, supra note 69, at 1107.
84. Id. (citing Hearings on S. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong. 29-32 (1965)).
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pressured Congress to take action.85 Congress acquiesced the following
year by delivering the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956.86
In doing so, Congress overrode the President’s veto, disagreeing with his
belief that water pollution was only a local problem.87 The 1956
amendments eliminated the second notice requirement and the requirement
of gaining the state’s consent prior to giving notice to a polluter.88 In place
of the deleted procedures, however, a new procedure was added.89
Following formal notification to the state warning of a dangerous discharge
of pollutants, the Surgeon General had to organize a conference among “all
[affected] state and interstate water pollution control agencies.”90 After the
conference, the Surgeon General summarized the discussion in writing,
analyzing whether the pollution was actionable and listing factors that could
cause abatement to be delayed.91 State agencies had six months after the
conference’s conclusion to take action regarding the pollution.92 If the
agencies continued to take no action, the Secretary was to call a public
hearing before an appointed board, a process substantially similar to that of
the 1948 WPCA’s public hearing requirement.93 The main difference was
“that the board was now required to make findings respecting pollution and
any abatement action being taken.”94 The board then compiled its findings
and recommendations, allowing the alleged polluters a second six-month
period to comply.95 If the pollution still had not subsided by the end of the
second six-month period, the Secretary could petition the state attorney

85. Id. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953 shifted the directive responsibility previously
executed by the Federal Security Administrator to the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, § 5, 67 Stat. 632.
86. Barry, supra note 69, at 1107. The 1956 amendments affirmed the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare as the supervisor and director. Id. However, the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service continued to administer and enforce the Act. Id. at
1108; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, Pub. L.
No. 84-660, § 1(a), 70 Stat. 498, 498.
87. 118 CONG. REC. 37,452 (1972) (statement of Rep. John A. Blatnik).
88. Barry, supra note 69, at 1107.
89. See id. at 1107-08.
90. Id. at 1108. Interestingly, the time it took to organize the conference counteracted
any benefit derived from deleting the second notice requirement. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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general to file an abatement action.96 The Secretary, however, could only
make the request if asked to do so by one of the states affected by the
pollution (a state where the health and welfare of its people were in danger)
or the state where the pollution originated.97 Basically, the Secretary could
not bring suit on behalf of the federal government unless someone was
complaining. Although changes were made from the 1948 WPCA, the 1956
amendments did little to make the statute more operational.
After 1956, pollution control amendments increased in their frequency.
Congress amended the scheme again in 1961 and renamed it the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).98 Although not much changed in
the way of procedure, the 1961 amendments reinterpreted the meaning of
interstate waters to include lakes and other bodies of water, such as
coastlines.99 This change was important because the 1956 statute had
eliminated isolated intrastate waters (such as lakes) and coastal waters
(oceans) from its control as had been allowed under the 1948 WPCA.100 By
reopening federal control over these bodies of water, Congress provided
more water protection coverage. Additionally, the 1961 amendments
consolidated the previously shared responsibility of enforcing the
FWPCA.101 The 1956 amendments allotted various enforcement powers
between the Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare.102 Under the 1961 amendments, the power of enforcement became
the sole responsibility of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare.103
Amendments in 1965, known as the Water Quality Act of 1965,
incentivized states to engage directly in water regulation.104 The 1965

96. Id. at 1109; see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch.
518, Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 8(f), 70 Stat. 498, 505 (1956).
97. Barry, supra note 69, at 1109.
98. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 11,
75 Stat. 204, 210.
99. Id. § 8(d), 75 Stat. at 208 (eliminating “interstate” and instead inserting “interstate
or navigable”).
100. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956 § 11(e), 70 Stat. at 506.
101. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961 § 1(b), 75 Stat. at 204.
102. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956 § 1(a), 70 Stat. at 498.
103. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961 § 1(b), 75 Stat. at 204
(relieving the Surgeon General of any responsibility in enforcing the FWPCA and instead
allocating all enforcement and administrative power to the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare).
104. See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, §§ 5(c)(1), 8, 79 Stat. 903, 90708, 910.
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amendments required states to establish their own water quality standards
with regard to interstate waters.105 Congress encouraged states to participate
in water quality regulation with the intent that local enforcement would
enforce standards set by the states.106 The likely theory was that if a state
established its own standards, then those standards would be ones with
which voters (citizens) agreed because the voters were the ones that elected
the officials.
If a state failed to create its own water quality standards, then the
FWPCA authorized the Secretary to establish standards for it.107 The
language of the FWPCA, however, stated that should a state fail to
promulgate its own standards “the Secretary may” create standards on
behalf of that state, conveying that such standards were not absolutely
required.108 Should the Secretary choose to establish such standards, the
FWPCA required that he give reasonable notice and convene with
representatives from affected agencies, states, municipalities, and
industries.109 If after six months the state had not adopted the Secretary’s
standards, the Secretary’s standards automatically took effect.110 The
creation of standards for interstate waterways aided regulation because
procedures for enforcing interstate water quality standards were not as
cumbersome as those required of merely “navigable” waterways (bodies of
water within a state that do not travel into another).111 Procedures used for
regulating “navigable” waterways consisted of a time frame considerably
longer than the “single six-month notice period” required for enforcement
of an interstate water quality standard.112
Only a year later, more amendments ensued.113 This time, Congress
turned its focus to foreign policy considerations.114 The 1966 FWPCA
further expanded the scope of protection to waters in foreign countries
where “pollution originating in the United States . . . endanger[ed] the
105. Id. § 5(c)(1), 79 Stat. at 907-08.
106. See id. (encouraging each state to “adopt (A) water quality criteria applicable to
interstate waters or portions thereof within such State, and (B) a plan for the implementation
and enforcement of the water quality criteria adopted”).
107. Id. § 5(c)(2), 79 Stat. at 908.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. The agencies involved included interstate agencies and federal departments and
agencies. Id.
110. Id.
111. Barry, supra note 69, at 1116.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1117.
114. See id.
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health or welfare of persons” there.115 Upon discovering such
endangerment, the Secretary of State could request that the Secretary of the
Interior116 call a conference of all responsible agencies and representatives
of the affected foreign country.117 Additionally, the amendments authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to require anyone polluting an interstate water
to provide a report disclosing the “‘character, kind, and quantity’” of the
pollutants being discharged.118 This addition to the FWPCA provided the
Secretary of the Interior a better idea of what measures should be taken to
reduce the specific pollutant discharged.119 While this may seem like an
obvious step, previous acts focused merely on abatement of the discharge of
pollution rather than also providing a mechanism for facilitating cleanup of
a pollutant that had already been discharged.120
C. Summary of Early Acts Laying the Groundwork for Future Legislation
(1948-1966)
Overall, these early amendments relegated little power to the federal
government. Congress continued to worry about allowing the federal
government too much power, and the anxiety over a supply of clean water
had not yet overpowered this concern. “[T]he awkwardly shared federal and
state responsibility for promulgating” tolerable standards, combined with
burdensome enforcement procedures, made the FWPCA inefficient and
ineffective with regard to controlling water pollution.121 The FWPCA
115. Id.
116. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966, Pub. L. No. 90-86, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 1608, 1608.
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966 transferred the responsibility of enforcing the FWPCA to
the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
117. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 206, 80 Stat. 1246,
1250 (amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 10(d)(2)). However, this applied
only to foreign countries granting similar rights to the United States. Barry, supra note 69, at
1117 (citing Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 § 206).
118. Barry, supra note 69, at 1117 (quoting Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 §
208(b)).
119. Id. at 1117.
120. Compare Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1246, with Water Pollution
Control Act, ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498, Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204, and Water
Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
121. EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). For
example, the 1952 Cuyahoga fire ignited due to oil that had built up from improper
regulation of surrounding facilities. Adler, supra note 8, at 102-03. The fire caused damages
somewhere between $500,000 and $1.5 million. Id.
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lacked economic efficiency as well due to its focus solely on the tolerable
effects of water pollution.122 Prevention of pollution often costs less than
the attempts to clean it up later.123 Congress, however, placed little
emphasis on prevention;124 nor did it require a polluter to rectify damage
caused by a discharge.125 Rather, the only penalty for pollution consisted of
possible abatement.126 While abatement might be obnoxious to the polluter,
the only real incentive provided by this penalty was not to get caught. The
law allowed a person to continue to knowingly pollute until required by the
government to stop. This “stop action” command was unlikely to occur
considering the number of steps required to enforce any FWPCA
provision.127
Even if the Secretary chose to bring an enforcement action against a
polluter and managed to accomplish each step, there still existed an
enormous obstacle to overcome: the lenient judicial standard.128 One of the
biggest problems with the FWPCA and its predecessor was that the judicial
standard requiring consideration of economic and physical feasibility
allowed “even the most heinous pollution” to continue if the court found the
standard not met (that abatement of the pollution was not economically
feasible for the polluter).129
Although Congress, in 1970, introduced civil and criminal penalties for
violation of the FWPCA, these penalties applied only to discharges of oil.130
While an important step, it was not enough. The FWPCA generally aided
the polluters’ “catch me if you can” attitudes due to the mild consequences

122. EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 202 (noting that the
premise of the act rested on tolerable pollution levels).
123. 118 CONG. REC. 37,452 (1972) (statement of Rep. John A. Blatnik) (“[T]his
undertaking is going to be costly, but the cost of inaction would be far greater, because
ultimately we are going to have to do the job and the longer we delay, the worse the problem
will become and the more expensive it will be.”).
124. See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 202.
125. See Barry, supra note 69, at 1121.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1120.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1119-21.
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of enforcement.131 The law lacked a true incentive not to pollute and
permitted distinct advantages to those who did.132
D. 1972: Getting Serious About Clean Water
The FWPCA underwent major reforms in 1972.133 Despite repeated
amendments to the FWPCA in previous years, enforcement procedures
remained “too lengthy and proved too vulnerable to political influence and
polluter pressure.”134 During the twenty-three year life span of the FWPCA,
only fifty-three enforcement actions arose.135 Of those, only one actually
reached a court.136 Unfortunately, the lack of enforcement actions was not a
sign of an increase in cleaner waters. Quite to the contrary, the waters of the
United States continued to deteriorate, pushing Congress to take further
action.137 The 1972 amendments significantly increased the enforcement
power of the FWPCA and more closely resemble our modern statute.
As water quality worsened, society’s attitude toward the availability of
clean water turned into one of genuine concern.138 There was hope that this
concern, in combination with new amendments, would generate advances
in technology to improve the condition of the water quality.139 One report
to Congress spurred this hope by demonstrating that new sewage treatment
technology had developed since the last FWPCA revision.140 For example,
a company known as Biospherics Incorporated developed new methods for
successfully reducing phosphorous levels in sewage.141 The removal of
phosphorous from sewage in locations surrounding the bodies of water in
the Great Lakes region and the Fox River enabled these waterways to meet
131. See id. at 1121. Because polluters knew the only real consequence of polluting was
the possibility that they would be forced to stop polluting, there was an incentive to continue
polluting until caught by the government. Id.
132. See id. For a more thorough look at the history of enforcement procedures up
through 1970, including history and analysis, see Barry, supra note 69.
133. Compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816, with Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
134. HARVEY LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS 20 (1975).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 15 (citing Water Pollution Control Legislation—1971: Hearings on H.R.
11,896, H.R. 11,895 Before the Comm. on Pub. Works, 92d Cong. 417 (1971) (statement of
Sam Love)).
138. See 118 CONG. REC. 37,451 (1972) (statement of Rep. Gilbert Gude).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Biospherics Incorporated reported to Congress that it created a PhoStrip method
to reduce phosphorous in wastewater. Id.
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Illinois’s water quality standards.142 Development of waste removal
methods inspired Congress to believe cleaner waters could be a reality.143
Such innovations are important because they show that, when necessary,
people rise to the occasion. Society is more likely to meet demands once the
demands are made.144 With this background in mind, Congress forged
ahead on the water quality frontier, fashioning drastic changes.
While Congress recognized the need for major changes, the proposed
amendments concerned some (such as the President) that the costs of
implementation would be too high.145 To this, proponents retorted that the
cost of inaction would be much greater.146 Congressman John A. Blatnik
observed that “[i]f we who are most responsible for the earth’s pollution
and best equipped to deal with it cannot afford to save the environment,
who on earth can?”.147 Congressman Blatnik’s answer came in the form of
ambitious goals, demonstrating Congress’s commitment to rectifying the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Innovation tends to come in times of need. For example, technological innovation
soars during wartime, with examples including the development of nuclear power for
commercial use, significant advances in the aircraft industry, and development of the
Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator (an early calculator) and the Selective Sequence
Electronic Calculator (the precursor to early computers). See VERNON W. RUTTAN, IS WAR
NECESSARY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH?: MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT 13, 35, 92 (2006). “It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the
historical role that military procurement has played in the process of technology development.”
Id. at 3. Similar innovations are likely to occur in the development of controlling water quality
once society is motivated to create them. A good example of environmental motivation is
found within the field of air regulation. In 1970, Congress greatly modified the Clean Air Act
to require a drastic reduction of car emissions by 1975, so that future emissions would “emit
one-tenth the level of CO (carbon monoxide) and HC (hydrocarbons) compared to current
[vehicle] models.” The 1970 U.S. Clean Air Act, HONDA, http://world.honda.com/history/
challenge/1972introducingthecvcc/text01/index.html (last visited June 30, 2013). In response,
automakers vehemently contended that such a high standard would be impossible to meet in
such a short period. Id. It is true that these ambitious deadlines for compliance were ultimately
extended. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 309,
331-32 (2000). One car company, however, was up to the challenge. See The CVCC Engine
System: An Immediate Success, HONDA, http://world.honda.com/history/challenge/1972
introducingthecvcc/text06/index.html (last visited June 30, 2013). Honda was the first car
company to meet the new Clean Air Act standards. Id. Feeling the competition from the
industry, Mazda came in second. See id.
145. See 118 CONG. REC. 37,452 (1972) (statement of Rep. John A. Blatnik).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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degradation of America’s waters.148 The goals of the 1972 FWPCA were
more straightforward than those of previous acts: to eliminate the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waterways by 1985, and to ensure waters that
provide a healthy environment for fish and other wildlife, as well as
recreational uses for people, by 1983.149 These goals could be achieved
through policies that (1) prohibited “the discharge of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts,” (2) provided federal financial assistance for public
treatment works, (3) developed state programs to meet these goals, (4)
promoted research of new technological developments for cleaner water,
and (5) encouraged efficiency.150 These goals were much clearer not only in
their aim, but also as to how Congress wanted them accomplished.
In order to achieve the goals set out, the 1972 amendments authorized
new enforcement procedures. The responsibility of enforcing water quality
control standards shifted again with the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1970.151 The 1972 amendments
appointed the Administrator of the EPA (the Administrator) the main

148. Id.
149. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec.
2, § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (f) (2012). The statute sets out the purpose:
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this
objective it is hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this
chapter—
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1,
1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to
construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment management
planning processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control
of sources of pollutants in each State; [and]
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be
made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans . . . .
Id. § 1251(a).
151. LIEBER, supra note 134, at 17-18.
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enforcer.152 Unlike previous versions of the FWPCA which required a
hazard to human health in a neighboring state to result prior to bringing any
sort of action, the 1972 amendments took a far more proactive approach.
Instead, Congress introduced a permitting system known as the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).153 This new permitting
system was similar to one instituted nearly seventy-three years earlier in the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899.154 NPDES became the
primary enforcement tool for the EPA.155 In an attempt to avoid preempting
states’ authority, the amendments allowed states to be in charge of issuing
their own permits if they created their own permitting programs.156
However, the permitting program created by each state was subject to
requirements set by the FWPCA and the Administrator.157
The concept of state standards created confusion. States were unsure of
whether their approved permit programs applied to federal installations
located in their respective states.158 In particular, California and Washington
became frustrated that the federal government did not believe it was
necessary for federal dischargers to comply with state permit program
requirements.159 The Supreme Court found that the 1972 FWPCA
amendments did not clearly state Congress’s intent to subject federal
152. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 101(d), 86 Stat.
at 816.
153. Id. § 402, 86 Stat. at 880-83.
154. Compare id., with Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30
Stat. 1121, 1152. Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (also
known as the Refuse Act) required that a permit be obtained prior to discharging or
depositing refuse other than liquid street sewage into a navigable waterway. Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, § 13, 30 Stat. at 1152; Diane D. Eames, The Refuse Act
of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1445-46
(1970). Unlike the CWA, the primary purpose of the Refuse Act was not to ensure cleaner
waters, but to ensure that navigation was not impeded by buildup of refuse in the rivers and
harbors. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, § 10, 30 Stat. at 1151.
155. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215,
276 (2003); 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:26 (2012).
156. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 402(b), 86 Stat.
at 880-81.
157. Id. § 402(b)-(c), 86 Stat. at 880-82.
158. See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976).
159. Id. at 213. Both California and Washington had stricter standards than those of the
national program under the FWPCA. See id. at 218; see also Cal. ex rel. State Water Res.
Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Brief for
the Respondent, State of California at 53-54, EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1975) (No. 74-1435), 1975 WL 173542.
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installations to state regulation, so the federal dischargers were not required
to obtain state NPDES permits before polluting.160
Regardless of whether an entity was subject to federal or state
permitting, the 1972 amendments expressly provided that the Administrator
was authorized to bring an action when violations of either were
discovered.161 Unlike previous versions, the 1972 amendments introduced
monetary penalties for noncompliance with either the NPDES program or a
compliance order issued by the Administrator.162 Establishment of penalties
for violators signified an important change in the enforcement procedures
of the FWPCA. Although the penalties were significantly less than they are
today, they were a vast improvement over previous penalties, which were
nonexistent save those for oil discharge.163 Rather than merely requiring
abatement to prevent future pollution, monetary penalties provided
punishment for past acts of wrongful conduct164 and were a more realistic
deterrent to discharging pollutants into waterways.
New enforcement procedures authorized the Administrator, upon
learning of a violation, to either issue an administrative compliance order165
or initiate a civil judicial enforcement action (with possible consequences of
civil penalties).166 Administrative compliance orders required either
abatement or limitation of the pollution.167 Accompaniment of monetary
penalties was not authorized under a compliance order.168 Civil and
criminal penalties, however, were available in the event that issuance of a
compliance order was not enough.169 Monetary penalties were imposed
160. EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 227. This decision was
later rectified by Congress. See infra text accompanying notes 200-202.
161. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(a)(3), 86
Stat. at 859 (“Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of section 301, 302, 306, 307, or 308 of this Act, or is in
violation of any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 402 of this Act by him or by a State, he shall issue an order requiring
such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.”).
162. Id. § 309(b)-(d), 86 Stat. at 860.
163. Barry, supra note 69, at 1121.
164. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(c)-(d),
86 Stat. at 860 (introducing monetary penalties for violations).
165. Id. § 309(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. at 859.
166. Id. § 309(b), 86 Stat. at 860.
167. Id. § 309(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 859.
168. See id. § 309(a)(1)-(3), 86 Stat. at 859; see also infra note 170.
169. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 309(c)-(d), 86
Stat. at 860.
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through enforcement actions.170 Civil penalties allowed for a maximum fine
of $10,000 per day that a violation of the FWPCA continued.171 If the
Administrator found the violation was either willful or negligent, criminal
penalties could also be assessed.172 Under willful or negligent criminal
penalties, the perpetrator could be fined anywhere between “$2,500 . . .
[and] $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than
one year, or by both.”173 For recurrence of a violation, the potential
penalties increased to “$50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than two years, or by both.”174 Criminal penalties might also be
assessed for anyone who made false statements on his application for a
permit, allowing a fine up to $10,000, imprisonment up to six months, or
both.175 Possible punishments of high fines and prison time significantly
increased the Administrator’s power to carry out enforcement of the clean
water regulations.
In addition to providing incentive for polluters to follow the law,
enforcement procedures became easier as well. Upon learning of a water
pollution violation, the Administrator was still required to notify the alleged
polluter and the state where the pollution originated.176 However, if the state
did not take action within thirty days after receiving notice, the
Administrator could immediately issue a compliance order or bring a civil
suit.177 For example, in United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., the defendant
was charged “with polluting navigable waters of the United States.” 178 The
defendant argued that prior to bringing a criminal enforcement action the
Administrator must first issue an abatement order, allowing the defendant
time to respond.179 The court held that while the 1972 FWPCA required the
170. Id.; see also LYNN M. GALLAGHER & LEONARD A. MILLER, CLEAN WATER
HANDBOOK 182 (2d ed. 1996). This is because the order itself is only a command, not an
adjudication. Id. To enforce the order (if the violator has not complied), the agency must
bring suit in a federal district court. Id. However, non-compliance with an order may give
rise to a criminal action for “knowingly” violating the order. Id.
171. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(d), 86 Stat.
at 860. The amount of possible civil penalty is now an amount “not to exceed $25,000 per
day.” 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
172. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(c)(1), 86
Stat. at 860.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. § 309(c)(2), 86 Stat. at 860.
176. Id. § 309(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 859.
177. Id.
178. 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 (D. Ariz. 1975).
179. See id. at 1183.
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Administrator to act upon learning of a violation, he had discretion in his
response and he was not required to bring an abatement order prior to
bringing a civil or criminal action against a defendant.180
Allowing the Administrator to bring suit at this point in the legal
procedure significantly shortened the process required to take action. No
longer was he required to wait for complaints from states or to go through
the process of requesting state attorneys general to bring suit.181 The
Administrator now possessed the authority to bring suit himself.182
Similarly, if the Administrator found that a state was not implementing its
own permit program, evidenced by pervasive statewide pollution, then the
Administrator could notify the state that it had thirty days to begin
implementation.183 Failure to do so could result in the issuance of
compliance orders or civil actions brought by the Administrator against
individuals.184 This would trigger a “period of ‘federally assumed
enforcement.’”185 Once the Administrator issued any order, a copy had to
be sent not only to the Administrator of the state where the pollution
occurred, but also to any other states potentially affected by the pollution.186
The orders had to be delivered by personal service, state the nature of the
violation, and specify a time for compliance not to exceed thirty days.187
In addition to permitting requirements for discharges of pollutants into
navigable waterways, the 1972 amendments created a special permitting
requirement if the discharge involved dredged or fill material.188 Unlike the

180. Id. at 1184.
181. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 309(a)(1), 86
Stat. at 859.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id. § 309(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 859.
186. Id. § 309(a)(4), 86 Stat. at 859.
187. Id.
188. Id. § 404(a), 86 Stat. at 884. “‘[D]redged material’ and ‘fill material’ are two
separate concepts.” Sylvia Quast, Regulation of Wetlands: Section 404, in THE CLEAN
WATER ACT HANDBOOK 113, 114 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011). Both are regulated under
section 404. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 404(a),
86 Stat. at 884. “Fill material” is any material originating from outside the body of water in
which it is placed, such as rocks or dirt from another location which were not originally
present. Quast, supra, at 114. “Dredged material” is “‘material that is excavated or dredged
from waters of the United States.’” Id. (citation omitted). It originates in the body of water in
question and does not require that any change in the water level take place. Id. The
difference between dredged and fill material is important because incidental fallback of
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NPDES permitting system, section 404 permits for dredged and fill material
were administered by the Secretary of the Army.189 Prior to authorization of
a permit for dredged or fill material, the Secretary of the Army was required
to issue public notice and provide an opportunity for public hearings.190
Presumably, this was done to allow people who might be negatively
affected to comment on the proposed permit.191 Part of the permitting
condition included specifying a particular disposal site for the discharge of
dredged or fill material.192 Despite the power of the Secretary of the Army
to issue these permits, the Administrator had the ability to override the
Secretary of the Army’s decision if the Administrator found that the
adverse impact of discharging in a given location would be too great.193 The
Administrator looked to the overall goals of the 1972 amendments when
deciding whether the adverse impact would be too great.194 The impact on
water quality for the purposes of providing drinking water, recreation, and
water healthy enough to sustain aquatic life were important factors in his
decision-making.195 This, however, was not a wholly unilateral decision.
Prior to overturning the Secretary of the Army’s decision, the Administrator
consulted with him to discuss why they came to different conclusions.196
Out of the 1972 amendments, section 404 probably created the most
controversy in later enforcement actions. Initially section 404 was thought
to apply only to navigable waterways—“‘those waters of the United States
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or
have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for
purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.’”197 But in 1975 the Army

dredged material related to an activity is not considered a violation of the 1972 amendments,
whereas the addition of minimal fill material can violate section 404. Id. at 114-15.
189. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 404(a), 86 Stat.
at 884.
190. Id.
191. See Quast, supra note 188, at 121.
192. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec. 2, § 404(b), 86 Stat.
at 884.
193. Id. § 404(c), 86 Stat. at 884.
194. See id. § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 816.
195. Id. § 404(c), 86 Stat. at 884. The Administrator could take into consideration such
factors as the “adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas
(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.” Id.
196. Id.
197. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (2000)).
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Corps of Engineers reinterpreted section 404 to apply to the filling of
wetlands, thereby expanding what was subject to regulation.198
Overall, the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA represented an important
change in social attitudes. The complexity of the amendments showed
increasing recognition of the importance of clean water. The permitting
systems provided a much more efficient means for achieving clean water
goals than did the mere abatement penalty used in previous acts. Permits
allowed the EPA to keep track of who made discharges and what they
discharged, making it easier to hold polluters liable for harm they caused.
Expansive measures allowed by the FWPCA caused a significant increase
in cases brought against polluters.199 The complexity of the FWPCA once
the 1972 amendments took effect left significantly less to be improved upon
than previous acts, and, as a result, only two large amendments were
subsequently made.
E. 1977 Amendments
Upset with the outcome in EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Board,200 Congress clarified its intent in 1977 to ensure
federal compliance with state standards and pollution control requirements.
Congress amended section 313(a) of the FWPCA to clearly express that
when the federal government is engaged in an activity resulting in the
discharge or runoff of pollutants, the federal government must comply with
state requirements “in the same manner, and to the same extent as any

198. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (“[I]n
1975 the Corps issued interim final regulations redefining ‘the waters of the United States’
to include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate
waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could
affect interstate commerce.” (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975))).
199. For example, a Westlaw search of “Federal Water Pollution Control Act” shows
there were over forty cases in federal court in the year following passage of the revamped
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Westlaw Next Search (go to “advanced” search, under
“find documents that have . . .” type in and use quotation marks around the phrase “Federal
Water Pollution Control Act;” then go to “date,” click “date range,” and use dates from 1-11973 to 1-1-1974; click “search.”), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=
advanced%3A%20%22Federal%20Water%20Pollution%20Control%20Act%22%20%26%
20DA(aft%2012-31-1972%20%26%20bef%2001-01-1975)&jurisdiction=ALLFEDS&save
Juris=False&contentType=CASE&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad7051c0000013c9268c904bb
50b5a6&startIndex=1&searchId=i0ad7051c0000013c9268c904bb50b5a6&simpleSearch=Fa
lse&transitionType=Search&contextData=(sc.Search). This is more cases in one year than in
the previous two decades combined.
200. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
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nongovernmental entity.”201 This decision by Congress ensured that no state
would be penalized for having standards more stringent than those required
by the federal government.202
Congress entitled the new amendments the “Clean Water Act of 1977,”
thereby renaming the FWPCA to “The Clean Water Act,” as it is now more
commonly known.203 Despite statutory amendments to make federal
dischargers comply with the sometimes stricter state standards, the 1977
amendments generally broadened the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction. The
CWA aimed to tighten holes remaining from the 1972 FWPCA.204
Realizing that much work was still needed in the field of compliance,
Congress created a compromise.205 It granted the Administrator the
authority, where necessary, to grant an extension to certain violators not in
compliance with CWA regulations.206 This extension ensured polluters
would have notice of the new requirements and provided them a reasonable
amount of time to comply. People eligible for extensions included those
201. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1598 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1)); see United States v. Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273,
1280-81 (3d Cir. 1978) (referencing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, § 313, 86 Stat. 816, 875, which provides that “[e]ach
department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged
in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants, and
each officer, agent, or employee thereof in the performance of his official duties, shall be
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity
including the payment of reasonable service charges”).
202. See EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 209-10. The State
of Washington attempted to force federal facilities within the state to comply with state
permitting requirements. Id. After the federal entities Washington tried to regulate
complained, the EPA decided that Washington’s permitting program was no longer
compliant with the federal NPDES permitting program. See id. at 210.
203. Clean Water Act of 1977, § 1, 91 Stat. at 1566. “The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) still uses both terms. Compare 40 C.F.R. §§122.1(a), 122.2 (2003), with 40
C.F.R. § 104.2(a) (2003).” Robert E. Beck, Water and Coal Mining in Appalachia: Applying
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Clean Water Act, 106 W.
VA. L. REV. 629, 633 n.19 (2004).
204. MALCOLM SIMMONS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB77043, WATER POLLUTION:
AMENDING THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT OF 1972, at 1 (1977).
205. See id. at 2. Due to the lack of manpower at both the state and federal levels and the
lack of guidance from the EPA, CWA obligations were not carried out at the rate Congress
previously expected. Id.
206. Id. at 3.
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who “acted in good faith, and . . . made a commitment (in the form of
contracts or other securities)” to be in compliance by 1979.207 Also, those
who applied for permits prior to 1974 and those already constructing
facilities to aid in compliance were eligible for extensions.208 As the
polluters worked to comply, the extension authorized the Administrator to
allow those in violation of the effluent limitation standards to release
pollutants into public treatment works facilities.209 Permission, however,
was only given if it authorized “the most expeditious and appropriate means
of compliance.”210
To further encourage future compliance, Congress added to the list of
those who could be held liable under the CWA. Section 54(b) of the 1977
amendments allowed for indirect liability against owners or operators of a
treatment works facility.211 This amendment allowed the Administrator to
bring a civil action against not only the person wrongfully discharging
pollutants, but also the operator of a treatment works facility.212 The
operator could be held liable if he knew of the violation and failed to
discourage the polluter.213 Holding the operator of a treatment works
facility liable for inaction ensured the maintenance of healthier water
systems.
The 1977 amendments focused heavily on the section 404 permitting
requirements for discharging dredged or fill material.214 The amendments
imposed a five-year limit on the life of a permit beginning from the day it
was issued.215 This helped clarify the length of time a permit holder could
207. Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 56(c), § 309(a)(5)(B), 91 Stat. at 1593; see also
SIMMONS, supra note 204, at 3 (stating that case-by-case determinations were to be made for
all extensions, that municipalities might obtain a five-year extension from the original July
1, 1977, deadline, and that industries had three options). Industries might comply on time,
obtain an eighteen-month extension, or, where an industry was working to invent a creative
technology, get more than five years before being required to meet compliance standards. Id.
208. Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 56(c), § 309(a)(5)(B), 91 Stat. at 1593.
209. Id. § 309(a)(6), 91 Stat. at 1593.
210. Id.
211. Id. sec. 54(b), § 309(f), 91 Stat. at 1591.
212. Id.
213. Id. If “an owner or operator of any source is introducing a pollutant into a treatment
works in violation of subsection (d) of section 307, the Administrator may notify the owner
or operator of such treatment works and the State of such violation.” Id. If, after thirty days,
“the owner or operator of the treatment works does not commence appropriate enforcement
action . . . the Administrator may commence a civil action . . . against the owner or operator
of such treatment works.” Id.
214. See id. sec. 67(b), § 404(e)(2), 91 Stat. at 1600.
215. Id.
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continue discharging dredged and fill material. By requiring permit holders
to reapply every five years, Congress took into consideration that
environmental conditions can change.216 A person once eligible for a permit
may not be eligible five years later, particularly if the discharge of
pollutants had unexpected consequences.217
The amendments also carved out multiple exceptions for various types of
polluters.218 Such exceptions from the permit requirements included
“discharge[s] of dredged or fill material” that were (1) a result of normal
agricultural activities, (2) necessary to maintaining and “emergency
reconstruction of . . . serviceable structures such as dikes, dams, levees, . . .
and transportation structures,” or (3) for construction purposes, so long as
any discharge did not interfere with the health and integrity of navigable
waters.219
Similar to the NPDES program, the 1977 amendments to section 404
introduced state cooperation plans for dredged and fill material.220 If a state
desired greater autonomy and preferred to implement its own permitting
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
See id.
See id. § 404(f)(1)(A)-(F), 91 Stat. at 1600-01.
Id. Discharge permits were not required where discharges were:
(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as
plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of
food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices;
(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including emergency reconstruction of
recently damaged parts, of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams,
levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or
approaches, and transportation structures;
(C) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds
or irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage ditches;
(D) for the purpose of construction of temporary sedimentation basins on a
construction site which does not include placement of fill material into the
navigable waters;
(E) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest
roads, or temporary roads for moving mining equipment, where such roads are
constructed and maintained, in accordance with best management practices, to
assure that flow and circulation patterns and chemical and biological
characteristics of the navigable waters are not impaired, that the reach of the
navigable waters is not reduced, and that any adverse effect on the aquatic
environment will be otherwise minimized;
(F) resulting from any activity with respect to which a State has an approved
program under section 208(b)(4) . . . .

Id.
220. See id. § 404(g)(1), 91 Stat. at 1601.
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scheme regarding dredged and fill material, then the state’s governor could
create a plan to submit to the EPA Administrator.221 The plan had to detail
the proposed program and include guarantees by the state attorney general
that the state possessed agencies authorized to carry out the permitting
plan.222 Once approved, the state had control over issuing permits and
gained oversight to any permits pending with the Secretary of the Army
prior to the granting of the state program.223 Also similar to the NPDES
program, if the Administrator found at any time that the state was not
administering the program appropriately, the Administrator notified the
state of its noncompliance.224 If the state failed to take corrective action
within ninety days of notification, the state program approval was
withdrawn.225 The Secretary of the Army would then again take over the
issuing of permits.226
221. Id. The jurisdiction of a state, however, was limited. See id. Waters not eligible as
part of the state permit program were those:
[W]hich are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition
or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign
commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high
water mark, or mean higher high water mark on the west coast, including
wetlands adjacent thereto . . . .
Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 404(h)(4), 91 Stat. at 1603.
224. Id. § 404(i), 91 Stat. at 1603.
225. Id.
226. Id. The amendments authorized the Secretary of the Army to use any of the
enforcement procedures under section 56 of the CWA against any section 67 violators.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, §
309, 86 Stat. 816, 859 (amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 56, § 309, 91 Stat. at
1592). However, if the Secretary wished to use other enforcement tools, he was in luck.
Violations of dredged and fill material permits under section 67 had their own additional set
of enforcement tools. Section 67 specifically authorized the Secretary to commence a civil
action, including seeking an injunction. Clean Water Act of 1977, sec. 67(b), § 404(s)(3), 91
Stat. at 1605. The Secretary could bring this action “[w]henever on the basis of any
information available to him” he discovered a violation. Id. § 404(s)(1), 91 Stat. at 1605
(emphasis added). This comprehensive language appeared to give the Secretary a broad
range of tactics for discovering permit violations. After determining that a violation existed,
the amendments required that the Secretary give notice to the state if he planned to
commence action against the violator. Id. § 404(s)(3), 91 Stat. at 1606. Punishment for a
violation ranged from $2500 per day up to $25,000 per day for persons found to have
committed the violation either willfully or negligently. Id. § 404(s)(4)(A), 91 Stat. at 1606.
In addition, such person could also be imprisoned for up to a year. Id. For a second
conviction, the potential maximum fine and possible prison time doubled. See id.
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Congress did not significantly alter the NPDES permitting requirements
through the 1977 amendments. In 1983, however, the EPA promulgated
rules to facilitate CWA enforcement. The rule requires those holding
NPDES permits to report their compliance to the agency.227 These reports
are known as Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs).228 They inform the
agency to what extent the permit holder discharged pollutants in accordance
with its permit.229 Dischargers communicate their DMRs to the EPA at
specified intervals noted on individual permits.230 For states with EPA
approved NPDES programs, dischargers may send reports to the
appropriate state agency instead.231 Generally, directions regarding where to
send DMRs are located in the letter granting the permit, as well as on the
back of the DMR.232 DMRs are a practical way to aid the EPA in regulation
and help permit holders remain aware of their discharges.
By increasing the time allowed for polluters to make good-faith efforts to
comply, Congress conveyed its awareness that compliance with heightened
standards would not occur overnight. Potential polluters needed additional
time to change their practices. In addition, the EPA needed time to adjust
allocation of its resources to ensure it had enough manpower to carry out
enforcement.233 This flexibility shows congressional sympathy and is a
realistic way to reach the goals established in 1972.
F. 1987 Amendments
Despite the changes made to the CWA, Congress determined that the
EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Army still lacked enough
enforcement power to sufficiently regulate the discharge of pollutants into

Furthermore, “[a]ny person who violate[d] any condition or limitation in a permit . . . and
any person who violate[d] any order issued by the Secretary . . . [was] subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day of such violation.” Id. § 404(s)(5), 91 Stat. at 1606.
227. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(6) (1983).
228. Id. § 122.41(l)(4)(i).
229. See id. § 122.41(l)(4), (7).
230. Id. § 122.41 (l)(5).
231. See U.S. EPA, NPDES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HANDBOOK 27 (2004), available
at http://www.deq.state.ok.us/wqdnew/forms/DMR-Manual.pdf.
232. See, e.g., Letter from Bruce Fielding, Envtl. Scientist Manager, La. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, to Charles Kendrick, Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. (July 13, 2012),
available at http://edms.deq.louisiana.gov/app/doc/view.aspx?doc=8456198&ob=yes&
child=yes (providing the specific location and agency where DMRs for the permitted
facility should be sent).
233. SIMMONS, supra note 204, at 2.
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the waters of the United States.234 As a result, in 1987, important
amendments were proposed that significantly increased maximum penalties
and introduced administrative penalties as a new mechanism for enforcing
CWA violations. In addition to changing how violations could be enforced,
Congress also added nonpoint pollution to the list of pollutants the EPA can
regulate.235 While these amendments promised to play an important role in
regulating our nation’s waters, President Reagan vetoed the 1987 Water
Quality Act, citing overspending as his main concern.236 Yet, the members
of Congress found that “Americans want[ed] clean water.”237 They saw
spending as an investment in the future of America.238 Despite the
presidential veto, the bill enjoyed tremendous endorsement from both
Houses of Congress.239
Although the President was concerned that the regulating of nonpoint
source pollution put too much power in the hands of the federal
government,240 the enforcement procedures allowed for regulation that gave

234. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 312-314, § 309, 101 Stat. 7,
42, 45, 46 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319) (adding more aggressive enforcement
mechanisms).
235. Id. sec. 316, § 319, 101 Stat. at 52 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329); see also 133
CONG. REC. 2799 (1987) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (citing EPA reports that identified
nonpoint source pollution as the cause of over half the remaining problems with water
quality).
236. 133 CONG. REC. at 2795-96 (President Reagan’s veto message dated Jan. 30, 1987).
237. See id. at 2799 (statement of Sen. Burdick).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2798 (statement of Sen. Chafee). The House of Representatives overrode the
veto with a 401 to 26 vote. Id. at 2799. The Senate overrode the veto by a vote of 86 to 14.
Bernard Weinraub, Senate Overrides Water Bill Veto by 86-to-14 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5,
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/05/us/senate-overrides-water-bill-veto-by-86-to-14
-vote.html.
240. 133 CONG. REC. at 2796 (President Reagan’s veto message dated Jan. 30, 1987).
The example used by President Reagan was that of farming. See id. He felt that by
“controlling non-point source pollution,” the effects would allow the EPA too much control:
[I]f farmers have more run-off from their land than the Environmental
Protection Agency decides is right, that Agency will be able to intrude into
decisions such as how and where the farmers must plow their fields, what
fertilizers they must use, and what kind of cover crops they must plant. To take
another example, the Agency will be able to become a major force in local
zoning decisions that will determine whether families can do such basic things
as build a new home. That is too much power for anyone to have, least of all
the Federal Government.
Id.
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power back to the states.241 Control of nonpoint source pollution actually
limited federal government interference.242 While the amendments provided
the states authority to manage nonpoint source pollution, they also
permitted each individual state to decide whether to implement such a
program.243 If a state chose not to create a control program concerning
nonpoint source pollution, then no program existed in that state and thus
there was no possibility of incurring consequences by the federal
government.244
For all other discharges of pollution, namely those previously subject to
EPA regulation, it appeared there were no arguments about expanding the
available enforcement procedures. It was noted that, in modern times,
“administrative penalties [were] commonplace.”245 Administrative penalties
provided much more enforcement power. Following the 1987 amendments,
the EPA could assess an administrative penalty for any matter on which a
civil action could be brought, including violations of section 404 dredge
and fill permits issued by a State.246 The Secretary of the Army, however,
retained enforcement power over violations of section 404 permits that
were issued by him.247
The 1987 amendments directed that “the Administrator or Secretary, as
the case may be, may, after consultation with the State in which the
violation occurs” issue administrative penalties in the form of either a class
I or class II civil penalty.248 Class I penalties provide a civil penalty up to
$10,000 per violation; however, the total amount of penalties to be issued
cannot exceed $25,000.249 After assessing a fine, the Administrator (or the
Secretary) must alert the polluter, in writing, of the prospective penalty.250
The polluter then, upon receipt of the notice, has thirty days to request a

241. Id. at 2799 (statement of Sen. Chafee).
242. See id.
243. Id. at 2802 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2800 (statement of Leon G. Billings). Congress found the statement by Mr.
Billings (a former congressional aide) representative of its feelings regarding the veto
override such that it included his remarks in the Congressional Record. See id. at 2799
(statement of Sen. Baucus).
246. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(1)(A), 101 Stat.
7, 46 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012)).
247. Id. § 309(g)(1)(B), 101 Stat. at 46.
248. Id. § 309(g)(1), 101 Stat. at 46.
249. Id. § 309(g)(2)(A), 101 Stat. at 46.
250. Id.
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hearing.251 Agency hearings are usually conducted in accordance with
guidelines set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).252 Sections
554 and 556 of the APA, specifically, provide guidelines for formal
adjudication by an agency.253 However, neither section of the APA governs
hearings for class I penalties under the CWA.254 Despite lack of regulation
by the APA, the hearing should still provide the defendant with “a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.”255 Class II
penalties are also capped at $10,000 per day for an ongoing violation; but
the penalty may accumulate up to $125,000.256 Unlike class I penalties, the
severity of class II penalties makes them subject to section 554 of the APA,
which provides for agency formal adjudication.257
The CWA provides a list of factors for the Administrator to consider
when assessing an appropriate penalty.258 Such factors include the nature
and circumstances of the violation, the “extent and gravity of the violation,”
previous history of the polluter regarding similar violations, culpableness,
and any “economic benefit . . . resulting from the violation.”259 This list is
not exhaustive and other factors may be considered.260
Administrative sanctions may be assessed with greater ease than civil
actions.261 However, because they are more efficient and assessed more
quickly, additional proceedings follow the issuance of administrative
penalties.262 Once the Administrator or Secretary decides to issue a penalty,
he must notify the public and allow the public a reasonable opportunity for
comment.263 Public notice allows interested parties to intervene, either on
behalf of or against the violator.264 Anyone who chooses to comment “shall
251. Id.
252. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (2012).
253. See id.
254. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(2)(A), 101 Stat. at 46.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 309(g)(2)(B), 101 Stat. at 46.
257. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 554.
258. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(3), 101 Stat. at 47.
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal Procedures
for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (1993). Administrative
penalties can be assessed by the agency without following formal procedures set out in the
APA or involving the Department of Justice. Id. at 2-3.
262. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(4), 101 Stat. at 47.
263. Id.
264. To determine when intervention is appropriate in civil proceedings, see FED. R. CIV.
P. 24.
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be given notice of any hearing” and allowed “a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence.”265 Once such comments have been made or,
at least, the opportunity for comments has been provided, the order may be
issued.266 Once the order is sent to the polluter, it becomes final within
thirty days unless the polluter applies for a hearing or seeks judicial
review.267 If the Administrator denies the request for a hearing, the order
becomes final within thirty days following the denial of the hearing
request.268
Although administrative penalties quickly became the enforcement tool
of choice, the 1987 amendments also increased the price of polluting under
the civil and criminal penalties, making them attractive reinforcement
tools.269 Criminal penalties were broken down by type into “negligent
violations,” “knowing violations,” and “knowing endangerment.”270 The
original penalty for negligent violations was retained from the earlier 1972
amendments.271
For a knowing violation, however, the polluter can be charged from
$5000 to $50,000 for each day the violation continued, be imprisoned for
up to three years, or both.272 The potential penalty for a second-time
offender increases to “$100,000 per day of violation” and incarceration of
up to six years.273 It is not necessary that the polluter intend or even know
he is violating the law, only that he is aware of what he is doing and
conscientious of his actions which cause the violation.274 Because there is
265. Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 314(a), § 309(g)(4)(B), 101 Stat. at 47.
266. See id.
267. Id. § 309(g)(5), 101 Stat. at 47 (“An order . . . shall become final 30 days after its
issuance unless a petition for judicial review is filed . . . or a hearing is requested . . . .”).
268. Id.
269. See id. sec. 312-313, §§ 309(c)-(d), 404(s), 101 Stat. at 42-46.
270. See id. sec. 312, § 309(c), 101 Stat. at 42-44.
271. Compare id., with Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, § 309(c)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 860 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(1) (allowing for punishment “by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both”).
272. Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 312, § 309(c)(2), 101 Stat. at 43 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)).
273. Id.
274. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that while
defendant must have had knowledge of his actions which constituted the offense, it need not
be shown that he knew his actions were illegal); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275,
1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “knowingly” did not require defendants know their act
violated the CWA, but only required that they were aware of their actions), amending on
denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
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no limit to how many days’ worth of fines one may accumulate, the
potential consequences of knowingly polluting make it a highly serious
offense.275
A new category for knowing endangerment presented the most severe
punishment of the criminal penalties.276 Knowing endangerment refers to a
polluter who knowingly violates the CWA and “knows at that time that he
thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury” through his violation.277 For such knowledge to be imputed to the
polluter, the polluter himself needs an “actual belief or awareness” that the
injury will result.278 Anyone who knowingly endangers faces a potential
fine of up to $250,000, up to fifteen years imprisonment, or both.279 Similar
to penalties for knowing violations, the penalty for a second knowing
endangerment offense doubles.280 While these fines may seem steep, hefty
fines are necessary to ensure that large polluters who have the potential to
harm many lives feel pressure to comply with the law. In particular, older
statutes provided greater incentive for a large polluter to weigh the
economic benefits of polluting and determine that the financial pros
outweighed the environmental and legal cons.281 Large penalties for
polluting are a deterrent to those attempting to measure the worth of a
human life against any economic benefit that might be gained from
polluting.
Criminal penalties should be used only where a violation is sufficiently
serious.282 Criminal sanctions are the most difficult to bring because they
275. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 312, § 309(c), 101 Stat. at 42-45.
276. See id. § 309(c)(3)(A), 101 Stat. at 43 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(3)).
277. Id.
278. Andrew Oliveira et al., Environmental Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 347, 386
(2005).
279. Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 312, § 309(c)(3)(A), 101 Stat. at 43. If the “person”
convicted is in fact an organization, the potential penalty increases to one million dollars. Id.
280. Id.
281. See supra text accompanying note 129.
282. See U.S. EPA, Guidance on Choosing Among Clean Water Act Administrative,
Civil and Criminal Enforcement Remedies, 4-5 (Aug. 28, 1987), available at http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/cwacivcriminenfremed-mem.pdf.
The
determination as to whether criminal penalties should be imposed ought to take into
consideration the following factors: (1) whether the conduct was knowing or negligent,
(2) whether the conduct was egregious in nature, (3) whether resulting environmental
harm was a foreseeable consequence of the conduct, (4) whether the conduct was of a type
that society has a particular interest in deterring, (5) whether the violator (polluter) was in
a category that should be specially deterred from such conduct, (6) whether the pollutant
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cannot be brought solely through EPA officers.283 To bring a criminal
action under the CWA, the EPA must work with the Environmental Crimes
Section at the Department of Justice (DOJ).284 Upon referring the criminal
violation to DOJ, the matter comes under DOJ discretion.285 It is then up to
the DOJ to determine whether to file criminal charges in federal court.286
Because of this referral process, many of the recommended cases are not
prosecuted.287 Differing priorities, resources, and expertise contribute to
DOJ decisions not to prosecute alleged environmental crimes.288
In addition to criminal monetary penalty increases, civil monetary
penalties also increased. Although civil penalties were originally capped at
$10,000 per day of violation, the 1987 amendments increased this figure to
a possible $25,000 per day of violation.289 The pre-1972 standard required a
court to determine the feasibility of abatement and the economic hardship it
would cause.290 The current standard instead requires a court to consider the
economic benefit gained from polluting and to hold such benefit against the
polluter when determining an appropriate fine.291
was a particularly dangerous material, and (7) who was responsible for the conduct. Id.
These factors are only considerations, they are neither wholly determinative nor exclusive;
other factors may also be considered. Id. at 5.
283. David A. Barker, Note, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1404 (2002).
284. Id. at 1404-05. There are a significantly disproportionate number of environmental
criminal investigators at the EPA versus the number available at DOJ. See id. at 1404. There
are nearly two hundred criminal investigators at the EPA, whereas the DOJ has only about
thirty. See id.
285. Id. at 1405.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 313(b)(1), § 309(d), 101
Stat. 7, 45.
290. See supra text accompanying note 129.
291. Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 313(c), § 309(d), 101 Stat. at 45 (“In determining
the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or
violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such
violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic
impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). This standard was added as part of the 1987
amendments. See id. The 1972 FWPCA, although having excluded the pre-1972 standard
from its language, did not appear to replace the language with a new standard. See Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 309(b), 86 Stat. 816, 860. Thus,
it seems that the 1972 act was enacted without providing a specific judicial standard to guide
the courts, a deficiency which lasted until the 1987 amendments.
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G. Clean Water Forecast: Future Implications of Past Legislation
Current enforcement against civil violations makes the CWA viewable as
a strict liability statute.292 Regardless of the intent of the violator or his
reasons for polluting, “once the violation [of the CWA] is established,
liability attaches.”293 Unlike earlier versions of the Act, which took into
account the economic feasibility and practicality of the polluter’s ability to
abate,294 the modern standard does not consider these factors for civil
enforcement purposes.295 This standard facilitates regulatory enforcement
because the only burden the EPA needs to prove is that the violation
occurred.
Criminal enforcement, however, has different standards. The state of
mind of the polluter is taken into account for criminal penalties, which vary
depending on whether the violation was done negligently or knowingly and
whether there was actual harm caused by the violation.296 Although a
polluter’s state of mind is more difficult to prove, when the penalty
involves criminal punishment, there is more at stake and the added burden
preserves the integrity of the enforcement system.
Congress has made very few modifications to the CWA since the 1987
amendments. It is difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of these
changes because the world has changed in the two decades since Congress
last amended the CWA. As a result of scientific discoveries and the
problems arising from nonpoint source pollution, there are some who
consider it time for new statutory revisions to address more recent
environmental pollutants.297 The conditions that the CWA aimed to combat

292. GALLAGHER & MILLER, supra note 170, at 173.
293. Id.
294. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 313(d)(3)(B), § 404(s), 101 Stat. at 45-46.
295. See, e.g., Kelly v. U.S. EPA., 203 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing in the
statute makes good faith or a lack of knowledge a defense. . . . [N]o such requirement exists
for civil or administrative penalties, [under] 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and (g). Civil liability
under the Clean Water Act, therefore, is strict.”); United States v. Winchester Mun. Utils.,
944 F.2d 301, 304 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345,
347 (10th Cir. 1979).
296. See Water Quality Act of 1987, sec. 312, § 309(c), 101 Stat. at 42-45.
297. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT: 30 YEARS OF SUCCESS IN PERIL 9 (Oct. 18, 2002), available at
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/117_Effluent_Limitation/Congressional_Statements/House/Succ
ess_In_Peril.pdf; Patrick L. Brezonik & William Cooper, Reauthorization of the Clean Water
Act: Important Issues for Water Quality Scientists, 94 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 47,
47-48 (1994) (explaining that because of newer research, some toxins which are listed in
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in the 1970s and 1980s are not necessarily the same as those that exist
today.298 Congress first introduced the WPCA to help combat visible
pollution such as raw sewage and other debris, much of which came from
identifiable sources.299 The CWA has been very successful in limiting
polluted waters caused by this type of point source pollution.300
Currently, however, the largest cause of water pollution and degradation
in the United States is caused by nonpoint source pollution.301 Much of
nonpoint source pollution is invisible to the naked eye, such as chemicals
and other toxins running off into the water (although not all of these
chemicals and toxins are from nonpoint sources).302 These invisible
pollutants are dangerous because oftentimes people are unable to taste these
chemicals, and the negative impacts on health may not be realized until too
late.303 That chemicals cannot be seen does not equate to safe water.
Although Congress addressed nonpoint source pollution in later
amendments to the CWA (the 1987 amendments in particular), nonpoint
sections 307 and 311 of the CWA need not be regulated any longer, but some pollutants which
are not included in the scope of the CWA should now be regulated).
298. Brezonik & Cooper, supra note 297, at 47-48.
299. Id.
300. Id. Point source pollution is that which comes from a readily identifiable source. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (“The term ‘point source’ means any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance . . . . This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture.”). Nonpoint source pollution is more difficult to
control because it generally includes runoff into streams, rivers, and lakes from unidentified
sources. What Is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/
whatis.cfm (last updated Aug. 27, 2012). Usually, nonpoint source pollution comes from
many different sources and is not directly dumped into a body of water. Id. An example is
agricultural runoff of pesticides or nutrients from fertilizers. Id. See generally Arun S. Malik
et al., Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of Pollution Abatement: Choosing the Right Trading
Ratio, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 959 (1993).
301. Brezonik & Cooper, supra note 297, at 47; see also What Is Nonpoint Source
Pollution?, supra note 300 (“States report that nonpoint source pollution is the leading
remaining cause of water quality problems.”).
302. Brezonik & Cooper, supra note 297, at 48. Provisions exist to allow the EPA
Administrator to alter the list of water toxins that can be regulated under the CWA. Id.
Revisions, however, are infrequent. Id. As a result, there are toxins listed which are not as
dangerous as previously thought and do not require heavy regulation. Id. Other chemicals
though, which should be on the list, have not yet been added. Id. This misallocation causes
inefficient monitoring with too much focus on less worrisome toxins and not enough
regulation of those posing more substantial risks. Id.
303. See David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515,
520 (1996).
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source pollution is not as heavily regulated as point source pollution due to
concerns of politicians at the time point source regulations were
strengthened.304
Enforcement of the CWA post-1972 led to significant improvements in
water quality.305 In the last decade, however, progress has slowed and the
rate of improvement has even declined.306 In 2009, the New York Times
published a series of articles reporting on the recent progress of the CWA,
observing that it has been significantly under-enforced in many areas of the
country.307 It has been suggested that this is in part because much of the
regulation under the NPDES program has devolved to the states.308 In 2005,
at least forty-five states were approved to conduct their own NPDES
programs.309 The problem now is that because so many states are
responsible for implementing the program themselves, the EPA does not
focus as much on the information those states provide.310 The solution
304. Id. at 515.
305. Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html?adxnnl=1&
pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1353531636-OL0IkAdyWwIEGirPGEKRiQ&_r=0.
306. Id.
307. Id. In West Virginia, coal companies “injected more than 1.9 billion gallons of
[toxic waste]” from coal mining operations into United States waters from 2004 to 2009. Id.
Three of the largest West Virginian companies reported “that 93 percent of the waste they
injected . . . had illegal concentrations of chemicals including arsenic, lead, . . . or
chromium.” Id. Despite reports sent to state officials, no fines were ever imposed for the
violations; nor were any injunctions filed. Id. Residents, however, suffered health problems
such as painful rashes covering their bodies after bathing, fertility problems, gall bladder
diseases, and corrosion of tooth enamel. Id. Research by the New York Times indicates “that
fewer than 3 percent of Clean Water Act violations [throughout the country] resulted in fines
or other significant punishments by state officials” during the research period. Id. Although
the Times included small as well as large violations in its compilation, such a low rate of
reprimand is discouraging and evidences heavy under-enforcement of the CWA. Id.
308. David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2005) (“Intuitively, at
least at first glance, there may be reason to think that it should make little difference whether
the states or the EPA has the lead in implementing our environmental laws. . . . But the
reality appears to be far different. The state-federal relationship has not been particularly
smooth.”).
309. Id. at 20.
310. Id. at 29 (“‘With little data coming back to states from EPA, many states built their
own information systems over the years so they could more easily retrieve information they
needed to manage their programs. As states built their own systems, system incompatibilities
arose, requiring many states to enter data separately into both EPA’s systems and their own.
Not surprisingly, since states primarily relied upon their own systems, they spent little time
worrying about the quality of the information in EPA’s systems.’” (quoting SHELLEY H.
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would seem simple—require the EPA to focus on the information provided
by the states. However, part of the reason for this decline in focus is also
due to environmental protection agencies being understaffed at both the
federal and the state levels.311 A possible solution lies in the hands of
citizens. Citizens can provide enforcement assistance by acting as
monitors.312 Monitoring takes place when either individuals or groups
generate “independently-compiled emissions data or compliance reports”
such as Discharge Monitoring Reports.313 These citizen groups are an asset
to thorough enforcement of the CWA and provide much needed aid.
Revisions to the CWA to better fund both regional EPA offices and state
programs, as well as revisions specifying enforcement priorities for
efficiency purposes, would help combat current reduced resource and
enforcement problems.
IV. How Due Process Changes Affected CWA Enforcement Procedures
As the CWA grew, power shifted from the states to the federal
government. Early versions of the CWA gave the states a large amount of
power as well as significant deference to individuals. This was exemplified
by forcing the federal government to maneuver a series of obstacles before
actual enforcement could occur and by placing heavy consideration on the
feasibility of individuals to comply. In its first twenty-three years of life, the
WPCA did little to create change. In 1972, Congress dramatically increased
the amount of control the federal government had in enforcing the Act.
Expansion was accomplished through the introduction of the NPDES
permitting system and creation of monetary penalties. Later amendments
further added to the enforcement arsenal, allowing agencies to have a
greater impact while using fewer procedures. Changes in the available
enforcement procedures correlate to evolving views of what means are
necessary to meet the requirements of due process.
METZENBAUM, STRATEGIES FOR USING STATE INFORMATION: MEASURING AND IMPROVING
STATE PERFORMANCE 17 (IBM Center for the Business of Government 2003))).
311. Id. at 17.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 18 (quoting U.S. EPA, CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE
PARTICIPATION 7 (1998), available at http://inece.org/CBldg%20Docs/citenf.pdf); see also
id. at 17-18 (“As two commentators put it: ‘[t]he sheer size of the citizenry . . . enables
individual citizens to monitor compliance throughout the nation and identify violations an
understaffed investigative agency might miss.’” (alterations in original) (quoting E. Roberts
& J. Dobbins, The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement, 1 INT’L CONF. ON
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT PROC. 531, 532 (1992))).
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A. Early Due Process and Control
During the early twentieth century and up until 1970, there were no
monetary penalties for violations of the WPCA/FWPCA.314 The dearth of
monetary penalties, however, may be attributed more to public
constructions of due process than those of the Supreme Court. For over a
century, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the use of civil
monetary penalties by an agency where such use is clearly intended by
Congress.315 It was the public that remained dubious of administratively
imposed monetary sanctions; many people believed that such fines should
be imposed by a court, not by an agency.316 Congressional delay in
allowing agencies to impose monetary penalties for violations of the CWA
may have been heavily influenced by the public’s opposition. While the
Supreme Court did not necessarily view administrative penalties as
violative of due process rights, Congress likely played to public views that
monetary penalties were a judicial, not an administrative, function.317
Particularly during a time when environmental laws were sparse, Congress
may not have felt this was a battle in which to introduce a controversial
measure such as administrative penalties.
B. Paradigm Changes in 1970s
Environmental legislation hit an all-time high in the 1970s. At this time,
the American people’s distress regarding environmental affairs culminated
in an “environmental movement,” providing an ideal atmosphere for

314. In 1970 the first monetary penalty was introduced for a violation of the CWA. See
Barry, supra note 69, at 1121. The penalty, however, only applied to oil discharges. Id.
315. Funk, supra note 261, at 5. In 1853 the Supreme Court upheld a monetary sanction
imposed by a United States customs agent against an undervaluation of imported goods,
imposing a 20% penalty for the crime. Id. Nearly a century later, in Helvering v. Mitchell,
the Supreme Court determined that a 50% penalty for fraudulent withholding of taxes was
acceptable and that the IRS had the power to assess such a sanction where Congress had
specifically denominated the sanction to be a civil penalty. Id. at 6 (citing Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)). There is a long tradition by the Supreme Court of upholding
the use of agency monetary penalties, at least in certain situations, where such use has been
expressly allowed by Congress. Id.
316. Id. at 8.
317. See id. (“[Administratively imposed penalties are] ‘repugnant to the basic principles
upon which our administrative law is grounded. [They] violate[] the fundamental rule that
the imposition of a money penalty is, with us, a judicial, not an administrative function.’”
(quoting Bernard Schwartz, 1952 Survey of New York Law—Administrative Law, 27 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 928 (1952))).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

760

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:717

Congress to act.318 As a result, Congress churned out environmental
legislation at a rapid rate.319 A 1972 report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) recommended that, for efficiency
purposes, judicial proceedings should not be required prior to the
imposition of an administrative penalty.320 Rather, one fined by an agency
who wished to contest the matter could request a hearing by the agency.321
The recommendation suggested that an agency decision be “final unless
appealed within a limited period to a federal court.”322 A recommendation
to increase use of civil penalties was adopted by ACUS,323 but Congress
apparently did not believe that the CWA’s enforcement procedures were yet
ready to incorporate such a new and provocative rule. Congress did,
however, decide the public was ready to face judicially-imposed monetary
penalties. The imposition of monetary penalties appeared in the 1972
amendments.324 During this time period, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly325 was still controlling and may have influenced the
requirement that monetary sanctions for violations of the CWA only be
imposed after a judicial hearing for a civil enforcement action. The addition
of these penalties in the 1972 amendments reflected the changing views

318. See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization
of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 88 (2001).
319. Id. Congress enacted many environmental statutes in the 1970s, such as the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (1972); the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (1973); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6091-6992k
(1978); and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1970). Additionally, the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (1969), became effective January 1,
1970. Kenneth A. Manastar, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, and the Varieties of
Environmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 1963 n.1 (2006).
320. Funk, supra note 261, at 9. ACUS is an independent federal agency. 2 AM. JUR. 2D
Administrative Law § 11 (2004). It functions as a resource for development of new laws by
conducting census-type research and giving expert advice and policy recommendations. Id.
Membership is made up of appointed private individuals, as well as appointed public
officials. Id. § 12. For an in-depth look at the development and importance of ACUS, see
Thomas O. Sargentich, The Case for the Reauthorization of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 687 (1994).
321. Funk, supra note 261, at 9.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
sec 2, § 309(c)-(d), 86 Stat. 816, 860.
325. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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about due process requirements and the power of the federal government
during this time.326
ACUS’s recommendation gained steam with Congress a little over a
decade later. The next major change to the available enforcement
procedures for the CWA occurred in 1987 with the addition of
administrative penalties.327 This newest tool allowed the EPA to assess
penalties and to enforce such penalties without ever having to enter a
courthouse. Instead, the agency itself could hold a hearing to be presided
over by an administrative law judge.328 Although the idea was not new to
administrative law, the changes in public views of due process since 1972
made the addition less controversial.329 In 1976, when Mathews v. Eldridge
was decided, the Court worked to narrow its previous interpretation of due
process requirements that were so broadly expanded in Goldberg.330 The
Mathews test involves balancing governmental and individual interests to
determine appropriate procedures.331 Application of the Mathews balancing
test to administrative penalties generally weighs in favor of the use of such
penalties.332 While individuals have an interest in a judicial hearing prior to
imposition of a monetary penalty, Congress balanced this by allowing for
judicial review of a monetary sanction when a review request is filed within
thirty days of sanction issuance.333 Congress found the governmental
interest in efficiency outweighed both the individual interest and any
benefit that earlier judicial review might provide. Because the 1987
amendments still allowed for judicial review of administrative penalties
when demanded, the added benefit of requiring a judicial hearing for each
one was found to be less than the governmental interest in assessing an
administrative fine.
Also prior to the 1987 amendments, the Supreme Court considered the
due process issue of the right to a jury trial, an issue which arose in the
326. Compare Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948), and Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246
(amending FWPCA), with Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, sec.
2, § 309, 86 Stat. at 859.
327. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 314(a), § 309(g), 101 Stat.
7, 46-49 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319).
328. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 35, at 261. When agencies hold formal hearings
internally, an administrative law judge usually presides over the hearings. See id. at 263.
329. See infra note 339.
330. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976).
331. Id. at 334-35.
332. See Funk, supra note 261, at 13-14.
333. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, sec. 314(a), § 309(g), 101 Stat. 7, 48.
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context of agency-administered monetary sanctions.334 Administrative
penalties are imposed before an opportunity for judicial review and are
based solely on the opinion of the agency.335 The Seventh Amendment,
however, requires that “[i]n [s]uits at common law, . . . the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved.”336 The Court, in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission, found “that when Congress creates
new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an
administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible,
without violating the Seventh Amendment[].”337 Assignment of
adjudicating public rights included determination of monetary sanctions.338
With the combination of both Mathews balancing and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Atlas Roofing, it makes sense that by 1987 Congress felt
the time was right for authorizing the use of administrative penalties to
enforce the CWA. Administrative penalties are a faster, more efficient way
of carrying out enforcement. Additionally, the use of administrative
penalties for enforcement purposes had expanded to several other
agencies,339 making the use of administrative penalties less publicly
controversial than they might have been if introduced at an earlier time.
C. Current Due Process Issues with the CWA
Although no recent amendments have been made, recent controversy has
arisen relating to wetlands regulation under section 404 of the CWA.
Wetlands regulation is unique in that it often involves control over a
person’s private property.340 While the CWA as a whole tends to regulate
waters to which no individual can reasonably lay claim (navigable
334. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977).
335. Water Quality Act of 1987, § 309(g), 101 Stat. at 48.
336. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
337. 430 U.S. at 455. The Court further stated that “Congress is not required by the
Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of
litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to administrative
agencies with special competence in the relevant field.” Id. The Court reiterated that this was
not a new concept. See id. It had for over a century upheld the use of such delegation of
powers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1937); Lloyd
Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932); Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
338. Funk, supra note 261, at 7.
339. 133 CONG. REC. 2800 (1987) (statement of Leon G. Billings) (“Today,
administrative penalties have become commonplace.”).
340. See Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in
Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 312 (1991).
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waterways such as rivers and lakes), the section 404 permitting
requirements can regulate land a person might reasonably believe he
controls. For example, if a landowner owns fifty acres of land, and on that
land exists a Corps-defined wetland, controversy may erupt over who
should legitimately be able to control the wetland portion of the property.
Because of this problem, there are claims that wetlands regulation
encroaches upon an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings
Clause.341 The Takings Clause states that private property shall not “be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”342 Although regulation of
property is not the same as a physical taking, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the Fifth Amendment may be implicated where government regulation
limits an individual’s use of private property.343 This type of taking, known
as a “regulatory taking,”344 is a major issue within the wetlands regulation
context because due process issues are implicated by the way such
regulation is enforced.
Most notably, recent due process issues emerged in Sackett v. EPA.345
Under the CWA, the EPA may issue an administrative compliance order for
an injunction to prevent further degradation of an affected water or
wetland.346 If an individual does not comply with the compliance order, the
EPA may also bring an enforcement action in court.347 While the law does
not expressly prohibit judicial review of compliance orders prior to the EPA
bringing an enforcement action, all federal appellate circuits that have
considered the issue have held that pre-enforcement judicial review of a
compliance order is not allowed.348 While compliance orders alone do not
341. Quast, supra note 188, at 129-30.
342. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
343. Quast, supra note 188, at 130 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001)).
344. Id.
345. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012); see supra Part I.
346. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2012). Compliance orders are essentially injunctive orders
issued by the Administrator. Id. An injunction is “[a] court order commanding or preventing
an action. To get an injunction, the complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate,
and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is
granted.” Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (9th ed. 2009). With the issuance of a
compliance order requiring injunctive relief regarding the filling of a wetland, it is inferable
that the irreparable injury comes from the possible permanent loss of the wetland unless fill
material is removed.
347. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
348. See Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct.
1367 (2012); Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1995); S. Ohio
Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1427 (6th
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have authority to impose fines, the EPA can threaten future administrative
or civil penalties through an enforcement action as occurred in Sackett.349
Although Congress has not authorized compliance orders to carry an
immediate fine, the EPA generally attaches the threat of a future fine for
noncompliance. This means that the party must either comply or wait for
the agency to bring an action in court while potential penalties accumulate.
Waiting for the commencement of an enforcement action while penalties
accrue can be intimidating to the parties against whom the order is issued.
The drawback of allowing parties to bring an action in court before the EPA
exercises enforcement, however, is that all parties could take all compliance
orders to court, causing a drastic increase in litigation costs and a
significant decrease in efficiency. While some disputes may be legitimate,
the cost of litigating each compliance order in court should be measured not
only in monetary terms, but also by the prolonging of noncompliance. The
longer one takes to comply with the order, the more likely it is that the
affected water will suffer irreparable harm. Dispute over the implications of
prohibited pre-enforcement judicial review is of major concern in
Sackett.350
The issue addressed by the Court, of whether the Sacketts ought to have
been able to bring suit prior to an enforcement action, is important in
determining the expanse of the EPA’s enforcement power.351 Throughout
the last century, there appears to be a general trend of increasing federal
power; but the issue in Sackett is unique. In this case, the petitioners were
afforded no opportunity for a hearing regarding the compliance order until
an enforcement action was brought against them.352 Yet, if they did not
comply with the EPA order, the potential fine for noncompliance would
continue to accrue for each day they remained in violation of the CWA.353
While the public has grown increasingly comfortable with administrative
penalties and compliance orders, the Supreme Court, in Sackett, expressed
its uneasiness with the idea of potential fines that cannot be disputed prior
Cir. 1994); S. Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir.
1990); Hoffman Grp., Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990). Note that these cases
all occurred prior to the Supreme Court decision in Sackett. 132 S. Ct. at 1367.
349. See Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141 (“The compliance order states that ‘[v]iolation of, or
failure to comply with, the foregoing Order may subject Respondents to (1) civil penalties of
up to $32,500 per day of violation . . . [or] (2) administrative penalties of up to $11,000 per
day for each violation.’” (alterations in original)).
350. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372-73.
351. See id. at 1372.
352. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1141.
353. See id.
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to enforcement.354 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the
EPA must make the opportunity for a hearing available prior to bringing an
enforcement action so as not to violate an individual’s due process rights.355
Due process is highly regarded in American society and is a fundamental
right that must be protected. Part of the discomfort with section 404 of the
CWA is that it impedes the potential for certain individuals to earn money
or to have the freedom to build on their land as they choose. But after
examining the history of CWA enforcement procedures, it is evident there
is also a grave concern regarding the state of American waters both now
and in the future. There are many who believe it is best to utilize all the
resources at hand in order to reap the benefits now, particularly in a society
that has become so accustomed to the idea of instant gratification. On the
other hand, there are also many who assume the earth will take care of
itself, replenish itself, and somehow manage to provide for the next
generation. Water, especially, is thought of as the ultimate resource in its
astonishing ability to cleanse itself of pollutants disposed of in its body.
Used for washing, building, cleaning, and more, it suffers from overuse in
many of these daily activities. There is an old West African proverb
warning that “[f]ilthy water cannot be washed.”356 Although running waters
such as oceans and rivers are more adept at ridding themselves of wastes
than are many other ecosystems on the planet, they can only do so much.357
Water does not have an endless capacity to renew itself, as exemplified by
the large number of American waters that are not fit for swimming, fishing,
or other recreational activities.358 As evidenced by the history of the CWA
and the history of the nation’s waters, it is apparent that government
354. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
355. Id. at 1374.
356. FRANK R. SPELLMAN & JOANNE E. DRINAN, THE DRINKING WATER HANDBOOK 35
(2d ed. 2012).
357. For example, the April 2010 BP Oil Spill “released an estimated 185 to 205 million
gallons of crude oil” into the Gulf of Mexico. Duane A. Gill et al., The Exxon Valdez and
BP Oil Spills: A Comparison of Initial Social and Psychological Impacts, 56 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 3, 3-4 (2012). People helping the clean-up effort were astonished at how quickly
the oil seemingly disappeared. Jeffrey Kofman, BP Oil Spill: Clean-Up Crews Can’t Find
Crude in the Gulf (July 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-oil-spill-crude-mothernature-breaks-slick/story?id=11254252#. Within a period of two weeks, skimmers
discovered that the collection of oily water in barrels was down from 25,000 barrels per day
to 200 barrels per day. Id. Despite the apparent disbanding of the oil, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration still banned shrimping seven months after the explosion.
Gill et al., supra, at 4. Such a ban suggests concerns that the surrounding seafood was still
unsafe for human consumption. Id.
358. See EPA, supra note 14, at 1-2.
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regulation is necessary. While the Supreme Court has not declared it to be a
fundamental right, it does not get much more fundamental than the
availability of safe water, either for drinking, for recreation, or from which
to obtain food. In the spirit of Mathews, it is important to balance the
necessity of water quality regulation with the due process rights of
individuals.359
There is no dispute that the Sacketts had an interest in using their land as
they chose. However, considering that wetlands have been protected since
the 1970s, it was curious for them to claim they were not on notice of the
permitting program.360 Application for a section 404 permit is significantly
cheaper than payment of the fines they accrued.361 Additionally, the CWA
expressly provides for an immediate appeal following the denial of a
permit.362 The government (through the EPA) has an interest in enforcing
the CWA and in continuing to work towards providing safe, clean water for
the American people, as well as sustaining fragile ecological systems.
Forcing the agency to provide judicial review each time an injunctive order
is issued will result in placing a higher burden on an already overburdened
and under-enforced government program. While this might be a positive
step for individual due process rights, it increases the risk of hindering
359. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
360. The Sacketts’ land was located near Priest Lake. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
Interestingly, the local golf course’s website boasts that, upon visiting, tourists can golf on a
course “[s]et amidst the splendor of natural ponds, wetlands and lush forest.” Priest Lake
Golf Course, PRIEST LAKE, http://www.priestlake.org/index.php/activities/things-to-anddo/11-attractions/47 (last visited June 30, 2013). Of course, this does not necessarily
translate to the presence of wetlands a few miles away; but the presence of abundant
wetlands and forests in the Priest Lake area does make the occurrence more likely.
361. For example, in Idaho, where the Sacketts sought to build, the Army Corps of
Engineers has a permit application fee of $10 for non-commercial activities and $100 for
commercial activities. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs et al., Instructions for Completing Joint
Application for Permit 1 (USACE NWW Form 1145-1, IDWR Form 3804-B, n.d.),
available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/RulesStatutesForms/StreamChannel/PDF/JointApp
InstructionGuide2010.pdf. Even accounting for the contractors that might need to be hired in
order to complete the permit application, one might imagine that the total cost would still be
less than penalties accumulating at either $11,000 or $32,500 per day of violation, as
proposed in the EPA administrative order to the Sacketts. Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). Additionally, “the Corps receives
about 80,000 dredge and fill permit applications each year and approves at least 90 percent
of them.” 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 27:2 (2d ed. 2012).
362. Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1146 (“The [applicants] could seek a permit to fill their
property . . ., the denial of which would be immediately appealable to a district court under
the APA.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/5

2013]

COMMENTS

767

success in the clean water fight, which recent statistics indicate is already
an uphill battle.363
D. Due Process Conclusion
While the WPCA/CWA’s initial purpose was to address concerns of the
decreasing availability of clean water, the evolution of due process views
appears to have advanced around the time the legislation became necessary.
Such advancement is fortunate because later enforcement procedures such
as monetary sanctions and administrative penalties have been instrumental
in implementation of the CWA by providing realistic consequences to
polluters. Despite any public concerns that arise from the shift of so much
power to the federal government, we must balance the benefits of efficient
regulation with the potential harmful effects on individual due process.
Although it would be ideal if our nation could obtain cleaner waters without
regulation, such a notion is pure fantasy, as evidenced by early CWA
predecessors that allocated significant power to the states and individuals,
and the heavily polluted condition of our nation’s waters during that time.
V. Conclusion
The CWA is an important tool in regulating water pollution. Prior to its
passage, the only recovery for those affected by water pollution was to
bring an individual action under tort law. The evolution of congressional
focus to a paradigm of public protection by providing a comprehensive
federal statute is significant in ensuring protection of American waters.
Although the statute began with a weak foundation, Congress slowly
modified it into a much stronger social policy as the public’s knowledge
and interest in protection of water as a natural resource matured and
progressed. Looking at the change in titles of water protection laws, it is
evident that Congress changed its goal from that of merely controlling
water pollution by keeping it at a tolerable level to one of actually
maintaining water that is clean. Part of the success resulting from the CWA
arises from the evolution of due process procedures. It is unlikely that the
CWA would be nearly as successful without the monetary penalties that
eventually developed and the ability of the EPA to impose them.
Although there are still challenges with implementation, the
improvements in water quality since the CWA’s inception are inspiring.
Water in rivers, streams, and lakes is significantly cleaner now than prior to
the passage of the 1972 CWA. This progress, however, should not prevent
363. See EPA, supra note 14, at 13, 15.
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the CWA from developing further and evolving with the needs of the
public. Both the states and the federal government must maintain vigilant
enforcement of the CWA to ensure the program continues working in the
way Congress intended. Such enforcement is essential to providing clean
water for a healthy environment and for the enjoyment and wellbeing of the
American people, both now and for future generations.
Alexandria A. Polk
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